Imperial College London

Dr Andre Veiga

Business School

Assistant Professor of Economics



+44 (0)20 7594 7957a.veiga Website




CAGB 484Business School BuildingSouth Kensington Campus






BibTex format

author = {Raposo, Osorio Veiga A},
doi = {10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.12.009},
journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organization},
pages = {114--126},
title = {A note on how to sell a network good},
url = {},
volume = {59},
year = {2018}

RIS format (EndNote, RefMan)

AB - I consider a monopolist in an industry with positive network externalities. The firm can screen heterogeneous consumers by offering multiple products. Screening captures a greater share of consumer surplus but also segregates consumers into multiple products, thereby lowering the total network surplus. Thus, screening is socially inefficient. I show screening is never profit maximizing: the monopolist offers a single product, but at an excessive price. Thus, excessive consumer segregation is unlikely to occur in industries such as online multiplayer games, financial exchanges and messaging software.
AU - Raposo,Osorio Veiga A
DO - 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.12.009
EP - 126
PY - 2018///
SN - 0167-7187
SP - 114
TI - A note on how to sell a network good
T2 - International Journal of Industrial Organization
UR -
UR -
UR -
VL - 59
ER -