Imperial College London
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Dr Andre Veiga

Business School

Assistant Professor of Economics
 
 
 
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Contact

 

+44 (0)20 7594 7957a.veiga Website

 
 
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Location

 

CAGB 484Business School BuildingSouth Kensington Campus

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Summary

 

Publications

Citation

BibTex format

@article{Weyl:2017:10.1257/mic.20150295,
author = {Weyl, EG and Veiga, A},
doi = {10.1257/mic.20150295},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
pages = {139--148},
title = {Pricing institutions and the welfare cost of adverse selection},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150295},
volume = {9},
year = {2017}
}
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RIS format (EndNote, RefMan)

TY  - JOUR
AB  - To mitigate adverse selection in insurance markets, individuals are often mandated to buy at least a baseline plan, but may choose to opt into a premium plan. In some markets, such as US health exchanges, each plan is responsible for the full expenses of those who buy it ("total pricing"). In other markets, such as the privately supplied "Medigap" top-ups to traditional government-provided Medicare, premium providers are only responsible for the incremental expenses they top up ("incremental pricing"). For parameter values calibrated to health exchanges, the shift from total to incremental pricing reduces the welfare loss from adverse selection by an order of magnitude.
AU  - Weyl,EG
AU  - Veiga,A
DO  - 10.1257/mic.20150295
EP  - 148
PY  - 2017///
SN  - 1945-7669
SP  - 139
TI  - Pricing institutions and the welfare cost of adverse selection
T2  - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150295
UR  - http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/60337
VL  - 9
ER  -
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