Imperial College London

Professor Emil Lupu

Faculty of EngineeringDepartment of Computing

Professor of Computer Systems
 
 
 
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Contact

 

e.c.lupu Website

 
 
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Location

 

564Huxley BuildingSouth Kensington Campus

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Summary

 

Publications

Citation

BibTex format

@article{Chizari:2019:10.1109/tdsc.2019.2921773,
author = {Chizari, H and Lupu, EC},
doi = {10.1109/tdsc.2019.2921773},
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing},
title = {Extracting randomness from the trend of IPI for cryptographic operators in implantable medical devices},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tdsc.2019.2921773},
year = {2019}
}

RIS format (EndNote, RefMan)

TY  - JOUR
AB - Achieving secure communication between an Implantable Medical Device (IMD) inside the body and a gateway outside the body has showed its criticality with recent reports of hackings such as in St. Jude Medical's Implantable Cardiac Devices, Johnson and Johnson insulin pumps and vulnerabilities in brain Neuro-implants. The use of asymmetric cryptography in particular is not a practical solution for IMDs due to the scarce computational and power resources, symmetric key cryptography is preferred. One of the factors in security of a symmetric cryptographic system is to use a strong key for encryption. A solution to develop such a strong key without using extensive resources in an IMD, is to extract it from the body physiological signals. In order to have a strong enough key, the physiological signal must be a strong source of randomness and InterPulse Interval (IPI) has been advised to be such that. A strong randomness source should have five conditions: Universality (available on all people), Liveness (available at any-time), Robustness (strong random number), Permanence (independent from its history) and Uniqueness (independent from other sources). Nevertheless, for current proposed random extraction methods from IPI these conditions (mainly last three conditions) were not examined. In this study, firstly, we proposed a methodology to measure the last three conditions: Information secrecy measures for Robustness, Santha-Vazirani Source delta value for Permanence and random sources dependency analysis for Uniqueness. Then, using a huge dataset of IPI values (almost 900,000,000 IPIs), we showed that IPI does not have conditions of Robustness and Permanence as a randomness source. Thus, extraction of a strong uniform random number from IPI value, mathematically, is impossible. Thirdly, rather than using the value of IPI, we proposed the trend of IPI as a source for a new randomness extraction method named as Martingale Randomness Extraction from IPI (MRE-IPI). We evaluat
AU - Chizari,H
AU - Lupu,EC
DO - 10.1109/tdsc.2019.2921773
PY - 2019///
SN - 1545-5971
TI - Extracting randomness from the trend of IPI for cryptographic operators in implantable medical devices
T2 - IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tdsc.2019.2921773
UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/70830
ER -