Imperial College London

Professor Emil Lupu

Faculty of EngineeringDepartment of Computing

Professor of Computer Systems
 
 
 
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Contact

 

e.c.lupu Website

 
 
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Location

 

564Huxley BuildingSouth Kensington Campus

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Summary

 

Publications

Citation

BibTex format

@article{Steiner:2019:10.1016/j.comnet.2018.11.003,
author = {Steiner, RV and Lupu, E},
doi = {10.1016/j.comnet.2018.11.003},
journal = {Computer Networks},
pages = {43--55},
title = {Towards more practical software-based attestation},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2018.11.003},
volume = {149},
year = {2019}
}

RIS format (EndNote, RefMan)

TY  - JOUR
AB - Software-based attestation promises to enable the integrity verification of untrusted devices without requiring any particular hardware. However, existing proposals rely on strong assumptions that hinder their deployment and might even weaken their security. One of such assumptions is that using the maximum known network round-trip time to define the attestation timeout allows all honest devices to reply in time. While this is normally true in controlled environments, it is generally false in real deployments and especially so in a scenario like the Internet of Things where numerous devices communicate over an intrinsically unreliable wireless medium. Moreover, a larger timeout demands more computations, consuming extra time and energy and restraining the untrusted device from performing its main tasks. In this paper, we review this fundamental and yet overlooked assumption and propose a novel stochastic approach that significantly improves the overall attestation performance. Our experimental evaluation with IoT devices communicating over real-world uncontrolled Wi-Fi networks demonstrates the practicality and superior performance of our approach that in comparison with the current state of the art solution reduces the total attestation time and energy consumption around seven times for honest devices and two times for malicious ones, while improving the detection rate of honest devices (8% higher TPR) without compromising security (0% FPR).
AU - Steiner,RV
AU - Lupu,E
DO - 10.1016/j.comnet.2018.11.003
EP - 55
PY - 2019///
SN - 1389-1286
SP - 43
TI - Towards more practical software-based attestation
T2 - Computer Networks
UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2018.11.003
UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/64463
VL - 149
ER -