Imperial College London

Dr Ke Han

Faculty of EngineeringDepartment of Civil and Environmental Engineering

Senior Lecturer
 
 
 
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Contact

 

+44 (0)20 7594 5682k.han Website CV

 
 
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Assistant

 

Mrs Maya Mistry +44 (0)20 7594 6100

 
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Location

 

605Skempton BuildingSouth Kensington Campus

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Summary

 

Publications

Citation

BibTex format

@article{Neto:2016:10.1007/s11067-016-9337-7,
author = {Neto, PA and Friesz, TL and Han, K},
doi = {10.1007/s11067-016-9337-7},
journal = {Networks & Spatial Economics},
pages = {1211--1241},
title = {Electric power network oligopoly as a dynamic Stackelberg game},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11067-016-9337-7},
volume = {16},
year = {2016}
}

RIS format (EndNote, RefMan)

TY  - JOUR
AB - Over the last two decades, the electricity industry has shifted from regulation of monopolistic and centralized utilities towards deregulation and promoted competition. With increased competition in electric power markets, system operators are recognizing their pivotal role in ensuring the efficient operation of the electric grid and the maximization of social welfare. In this article, we propose a hypothetical new market of dynamic spa- tial network equilibrium among consumers, system operators and electricity generators as the solution of a dynamic Stackelberg game. In that game, generators form an oligopoly and act as Cournot-Nash competitors who non-cooperatively maximize their own profits. The market monitor attempts to increase social welfare by intelligently employing equi- librium congestion pricing anticipating the actions of generators. The market monitor influences the generators by charging network access fees that influence power flows to- wards a perfectly competitive scenario. Our approach anticipates uncompetitive behavior and minimizes the impacts upon society. The resulting game is modeled as a Mathemat- ical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). We present an illustrative example as well as a stylized 15-node network of the Western European electric grid.
AU - Neto,PA
AU - Friesz,TL
AU - Han,K
DO - 10.1007/s11067-016-9337-7
EP - 1241
PY - 2016///
SN - 1572-9427
SP - 1211
TI - Electric power network oligopoly as a dynamic Stackelberg game
T2 - Networks & Spatial Economics
UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11067-016-9337-7
UR - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11067-016-9337-7
UR - https://link.springer.com/
UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/42967
VL - 16
ER -