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@article{Ostrovski:2014:10.3934/jdg.2014.1.621,
author = {Ostrovski, G and van, Strien S},
doi = {10.3934/jdg.2014.1.621},
journal = {Journal of Dynamics and Games},
title = {Payoff Performance of Fictitious Play},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2014.1.621},
year = {2014}
}

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TY  - JOUR
AB  - We investigate how well continuous-time fictitious play in two-player gamesperforms in terms of average payoff, particularly compared to Nash equilibriumpayoff. We show that in many games, fictitious play outperforms Nashequilibrium on average or even at all times, and moreover that any game islinearly equivalent to one in which this is the case. Conversely, we provideconditions under which Nash equilibrium payoff dominates fictitious playpayoff. A key step in our analysis is to show that fictitious play dynamicsasymptotically converges the set of coarse correlated equilibria (a fact whichis implicit in the literature).
AU  - Ostrovski,G
AU  - van,Strien S
DO  - 10.3934/jdg.2014.1.621
PY  - 2014///
SN  - 2164-6066
TI  - Payoff Performance of Fictitious Play
T2  - Journal of Dynamics and Games
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2014.1.621
UR  - http://arxiv.org/abs/1308.4049v2
UR  - http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/19132
ER  -

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ProfessorSebastianvan Strien

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