Publications
120 results found
Prat A, Valletti TM, 2003, Spectrum auctions versus beauty contests: costs and benefits, Antitrust, regulation and competition, Editors: Baldassarri, Lambertini, Basingstoke, Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan, Pages: 49-100, ISBN: 9781403908032
Gruber H, Valletti TM, 2003, Mobile telecommunications and regulatory frameworks, Emerging telecommunications networks: the international handbook of telecommunications economics, volume II, Editors: Madden, Cheltenham, Publisher: Edward Elgar, Pages: 151-179, ISBN: 9781840642964
Cambini C, Ravazzi P, Valletti T, 2003, Il mercato delle telecomunicazioni - Dal monopolio alla liberalizzazione negli Stati Uniti e nell'UE, Bologna, Publisher: il Mulino, ISBN: 9788815093448
Valletti TM, 2002, Privatization, restructuring, and regulation of network utilities., ECONOMICA, Vol: 69, Pages: 526-528, ISSN: 0013-0427
Valletti TM, 2002, Location choice and price discrimination in a duopoly, REGIONAL SCIENCE AND URBAN ECONOMICS, Vol: 32, Pages: 339-358, ISSN: 0166-0462
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- Citations: 9
Estache A, Manacorda M, Valletti TM, 2002, Telecommunication reforms, access regulation, and Internet adoption in Latin America, Economia, ISSN: 1533-6239
The authors review the stylized facts on regulatory reform in telecommunications and its effects on telecommunications development and Internet penetration in Latin America. Relying on data from the International Telecommunication Union, the Information for Development Program (InfoDev), and the World Bank for 1990-99, the authors then test econometrically the determinants of the differences in Internet penetration rates across Latin America. The results show that effective implementation of the reform agenda in telecommunications regulation could accelerate adoption of the Internet in Latin America-even though it is only part of the solution (income levels, income distribution, and access to primary infrastructure are the main determinants of growth in Internet connections and use). Regulation will work by cutting costs. Cost cutting will require that regulators in the region take a much closer look at the design of interconnection rules and at the tradeoffs that emerge from the complex issues involved. It will also require a commitment to developing analytical instruments, such as cost models, to sort out many of the problems. Appropriate cost models will generate benchmarks that are much more consistent with the local issues and with the local cost of capital than international benchmarks will ever be for countries in unstable macroeconomic situations. Cost cutting will require an equally strong commitment to imposing regulatory accounting systems that reduce the information asymmetrics that incumbents use to reduce the risks of entry. All these changes will ultimately require a stronger commitment by competition agencies, since in many countries a failure to negotiate interconnection agreements will raise competition issues just as often as it will raise regulatory questions.
Valletti TM, Hoernig S, Barros PP, 2002, Universal service and entry: The role of uniform pricing and coverage constraints, JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS, Vol: 21, Pages: 169-190, ISSN: 0922-680X
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- Citations: 48
Cambini C, Valletti T, 2002, I mercati della comunicazione nell'era digitale, Bologna, Publisher: il Mulino, ISBN: 9788815088338
Estache A, Valletti T, Manacorda M, 2002, Telecoms, Reform, Access Regulation and Internet Adoption in Latin America
Valletti TM, 2001, Inform... Spectrum property rights, Info, Vol: 3, ISSN: 1463-6697
The UK's independent spectrum review offers an opportunity to replace the current inefficient and centralized model with a market-based system based on property rights. While the review presents a good case for change, incumbents will want to maintain the status quo, because the present system imposes undue burdens on potential new entrants, effectively restricting competition.
Valletti TM, 2001, Spectrum trading, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY, Vol: 25, Pages: 655-670, ISSN: 0308-5961
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- Citations: 38
Mason R, Valletti TM, 2001, Competition in communication networks: pricing and regulation, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol: 17, Pages: 389-415, ISSN: 0266-903X
Valletti TM, 2001, Competition in telecommunications., ECONOMICA, Vol: 68, Pages: 458-460, ISSN: 0013-0427
Prat A, Valletti TM, 2001, Spectrum auctions versus beauty contests: costs and benefits, Rivista di Politica Economica, Vol: 91, Pages: 59-109, ISSN: 0035-6468
Valletti TM, 2000, Switching costs in vertically-related markets, Review of Industrial Organization, Vol: 17, Pages: 395-409
Valletti TM, 2000, Price discrimination and price dispersion in a duopoly, Research in Economics, Vol: 54, Pages: 351-374
Valletti TM, 2000, Minimum quality standards under Cournot competition, Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol: 18, Pages: 237-247
Valletti TM, 2000, Symposium on universal service obligation and competition, Information Economics and Policy, Vol: 12, Pages: 205-210
Valletti TM, 2000, Introduction: Symposium on universal service obligation and competition, Vol: 12, Pages: 205-210
Valletti TM, Cave M, 2000, Are spectrum auctions ruining our grandchildren's future?, Info, Vol: 2, Pages: 347-350, ISSN: 1463-6697
Valletti TM, Cambini C, Ravazzi P, 2000, Regolamentazione e mercato nelle telecomunicazioni, Roma, Publisher: Carocci Editore
Valletti TM, Cave M, 2000, Regulation and Competition in telecommunications, Regulatory reforms and competitiveness in Europe, Vol. II, vertical issues, Editors: Galli, Pelkmans, Chelthenham, Publisher: Edward Elgar
Valletti TM, 1999, Le telecomunicazioni in Gran Bretagna, Politica Economica, Vol: 17, Pages: 329-380
Valletti TM, 1999, The practice of access pricing: telecommunications in the United Kingdom, Utilities Policy, Vol: 8, Pages: 83-98
Valletti TM, Estache A, 1999, The theory of access pricing : an overview for infrastructure regulators
An important component of policies to promote effective competition among all segments of network industries (such as electricity, telecommunications, or railways) is a regulatory environment guaranteeing that competitors have access to the services of potential"bottleneck"facilities too costly to duplicate. Rules covering fair access to these facilities - including fair access prices - generally improve economic efficiency by easing competition in markets both upstream and downstream from the bottleneck. Appropriate access pricing rules are especially needed when a dominant firm controls the supply of one or more inputs -- for example, gas transportation, electricity transmission, local telecommunication access, or railway track -- vital for its competitors. Access pricing is part of the antitrust concern central to the so-called essential facilities doctrine covered by U.S. legislation. It is also related broadly to such competition policy issues as quantity discounts, cross-subsidies, tie-ins, refusals to deal or unbundle, exclusive dealing, and predatory pricing. Access pricing is one of the most important and controversial questions in regulating infrastructure services. This complexity stems partly from the practical fact that access rules can be discussed only with reference to the rest of the regulatory environment, since regulators have many goals and constraints. In their survey of access pricing, the authors try to make it clear that access rules should not be assigned too many expectations. There are a few things access prices already do, however, and should continue doing until an all-encompassing solution comes along. Their survey covers access rules for both vertically unbundled and vertically integrated industries. It addresses the question: what happens if access is left unregulated? And it discusses the main challenges to implementation: calculating and allocating costs, finding a usage-based solution to the access pricing problem (the gl
Valletti TM, 1998, Two-part access prices and imperfect competition, Information Economics & Policy, Vol: 10, Pages: 305-323
Valletti TM, 1998, A model of competition in mobile communications, Information Economics & Policy, Vol: 11, Pages: 61-72
Valletti TM, Cave M, 1998, Competition in UK mobile communications, Telecommunications Policy, Vol: 22, Pages: 109-131, ISSN: 0308-5961
Valletti TM, 1996, Accesso alla rete, regolamentazione e manipolazioni contabili: alcune considerazioni teoriche nel settore delle telecomunicazioni, Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, Vol: 104, Pages: 441-466
Valletti TM, 1996, Accordi verticali fra imprese, L'industria, Vol: 17, Pages: 573-603
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