Imperial College London
Portrait Picture

ProfessorTommasoValletti

Business School

Professor of Economics
 
 
 
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Contact

 

+44 (0)20 7594 9215t.valletti Website CV

 
 
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Location

 

417City and Guilds BuildingSouth Kensington Campus

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Summary

 

Publications

Citation

BibTex format

@article{Valletti:2016:10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.005,
author = {Valletti, T and Clavora', F},
doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.005},
journal = {Economics Letters},
pages = {10--14},
title = {Selling customer information to competing firms},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.005},
volume = {149},
year = {2016}
}
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RIS format (EndNote, RefMan)

TY  - JOUR
AB  - We consider a data broker that holds precise information aboutcustomer preferences. The data broker can sell this data set eitherexclusively to one of two differentiated competing firms, or to bothof them. If a downstream firm obtains the data set, it can practicepersonalized pricing, else it has to offer a uniform price to customers.The first-best allocation can be achieved when data are sold non exclusively,but this never arises in equilibrium. The data broker insteadsells the data set exclusively either to the high quality firm or to thelow quality firm rival, according to their quality-adjusted cost differential.This leads to inefficient allocations.
AU  - Valletti,T
AU  - Clavora',F
DO  - 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.005
EP  - 14
PY  - 2016///
SN  - 0165-1765
SP  - 10
TI  - Selling customer information to competing firms
T2  - Economics Letters
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.005
UR  - http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/41286
VL  - 149
ER  -
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