Title: Automated Market Makers Designs Beyond Constant Functions
Abstract: Popular automated market makers (AMMs) use constant function markets (CFMs) to clear the demand and supply in the pool of liquidity. A key drawback in the implementation of CFMs is that liquidity providers (LPs) are currently providing liquidity at a loss, on average. In this paper, we propose two new designs for decentralised trading venues, the arithmetic liquidity pool (ALP) and the geometric liquidity pool (GLP). In both pools, LPs choose impact functions that determine how liquidity taking orders impact the marginal exchange rate of the pool, and set the price of liquidity in the form of quotes around the marginal rate. The impact functions and the quotes determine the dynamics of the marginal rate and the price of liquidity. We show that CFMs are a subset of ALP; specifically, given a trading function of a CFM, there are impact functions and quotes in the ALP that replicate the marginal rate dynamics and the execution costs in the CFM. For the ALP and GLP, we propose an optimal liquidity provision strategy where the price of liquidity maximises the LP’s expected profit and the strategy depends on the LP’s (i) tolerance to inventory risk and (ii) views on the demand for liquidity. Our strategies admit closed-form solutions and are computationally efficient. We show that the price of liquidity in CFMs is suboptimal in the ALP. Also, we give conditions on the impact functions and the liquidity provision strategy to prevent arbitrages from rountrip trades. Finally, we use transaction data from Binance and Uniswap v3 to show that liquidity provision is not a loss-leading activity in the ALP. This is joint work with A. Cartea, F. Drissi, L. Sanchez-Betancourt and L. Szpruch.