Imperial College London
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ProfessorAbbasEdalat

Faculty of Engineering, Department of Computing

Professor in Computer Science & Maths
 
 
 
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Contact

 

+44 (0)20 7594 8245a.edalat Website

 
 
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Location

 

420Huxley BuildingSouth Kensington Campus

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Summary

 

Publications

Citation

BibTex format

@article{Edalat:2018:10.3390/g9040085,
author = {Edalat, A and Ghorban, S and Ghoroghi, A},
doi = {10.3390/g9040085},
journal = {Games},
title = {Ex Post Nash Equilibrium in Linear Bayesian Games for Decision Making in Multi-Environments},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g9040085},
volume = {9},
year = {2018}
}
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RIS format (EndNote, RefMan)

TY  - JOUR
AB  - We show that a Bayesian game where the type space of each agent is a bounded set of m-dimensional vectors with non-negative components and the utility of each agent depends linearly on its own type only is equivalent to a simultaneous competition in m basic games which is called a uniform multigame. The type space of each agent can be normalised to be given by the     ( m - 1 )    -dimensional simplex. This class of m-dimensional Bayesian games, via their equivalence with uniform multigames, can model decision making in multi-environments in a variety of circumstances, including decision making in multi-markets and decision making when there are both material and social utilities for agents as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Trust Game. We show that, if a uniform multigame in which the action set of each agent consists of one Nash equilibrium inducing action per basic game has a pure ex post Nash equilibrium on the boundary of its type profile space, then it has a pure ex post Nash equilibrium on the whole type profile space. We then develop an algorithm, linear in the number of types of the agents in such a multigame, which tests if a pure ex post Nash equilibrium on the vertices of the type profile space can be extended to a pure ex post Nash equilibrium on the boundary of its type profile space in which case we obtain a pure ex post Nash equilibrium for the multigame.
AU  - Edalat,A
AU  - Ghorban,S
AU  - Ghoroghi,A
DO  - 10.3390/g9040085
PY  - 2018///
SN  - 2073-4336
TI  - Ex Post Nash Equilibrium in Linear Bayesian Games for Decision Making in Multi-Environments
T2  - Games
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g9040085
UR  - http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/64312
VL  - 9
ER  -
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