Publications
19 results found
De Jong A, Jonker J, Roell A, et al., 2023, Repurposing Institutions: Trust Offices and the Dutch Financial System, 1690s-2000s, ENTERPRISE & SOCIETY, Vol: 24, Pages: 197-221, ISSN: 1467-2227
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- Citations: 2
De Jong A, Röell A, Westerhuis G, 2014, The evolving role of shareholders in dutch corporate governance, 1900-2010, Varieties of Capitalism and Business History: The Dutch Case, Pages: 50-77, ISBN: 9781138784932
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- Citations: 3
Peng L, Roeell A, 2014, Managerial incentives and stock price manipulation, The Journal of Finance, Vol: 69, Pages: 487-526, ISSN: 0022-1082
We present a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in a position to manipulate short‐term stock prices and the manipulation propensity is uncertain. We analyze the tradeoffs involved in conditioning pay on long‐ versus short‐term performance and show how manipulation, and investors' uncertainty about it, affects the equilibrium pay contract and the informativeness of prices. Firm and manager characteristics determine the optimal compensation scheme: the strength of incentives, the pay horizon, and the use of options. We consider how corporate governance and disclosure regulations can help create an environment that enables better contracting.
Foucault T, Pagano M, Roell A, et al., 2013, Market Liquidity Theory, Evidence, and Policy, Publisher: Oxford University Press, ISBN: 9780199936243
This book offers an authorative take on the liquidity of securities markets, its determinants, and its effects.
de Jong A, Jonker J, Roeell A, 2013, Dutch Corporate Finance, 1602-1850, HANDBOOK OF KEY GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS AND INFRASTRUCTURE, Editors: Caprio, Arner, BecK, Calomiris, Neal, Veron, Publisher: ELSEVIER ACADEMIC PRESS INC, Pages: 73-83, ISBN: 978-0-12-397873-8
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- Citations: 3
Becht M, Bolton P, Roeell A, 2012, Why bank governance is different, OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, Vol: 27, Pages: 437-463, ISSN: 0266-903X
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- Citations: 109
de Jong A, Roeell A, Westerhuis G, 2011, Changing National Business Systems: Corporate Governance and Financing in the Netherlands, 1945-2005, BUSINESS HISTORY REVIEW, Vol: 84, Pages: 773-798, ISSN: 0007-6805
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- Citations: 19
Jong AD, Röell A, Westerhuis G, 2010, Changing national business systems:Corporate governance and financing in the Netherlands, 1945-2005, Business History Review, Vol: 84, Pages: 773-798, ISSN: 0007-6805
This study traces the evolution of corporate governance and financing structures in the Netherlands during the second half of the twentieth century. A description of Dutch shareholder rights, financing structures, and networks of directors reveals the changes that have occurred in many aspects of the Dutch corporate system over the course of six decades. The case of Royal Ahold illustrates some of the developments that have taken place. Most indicate a transition from a coordinated market economy to a more liberal system. The internationalization of the Dutch economy, which has played an important role in the transition of the system, is reflected in the expansion of Dutch firms beyond the national borders and in the growing number of foreign investors in Dutch firms. © 2010 by The President and Fellows of Harvard College.
Roell A, Foucault T, Pagano M, 2010, Market Transparency, Encyclopedia of quantitative finance. 3. K - Q, Editors: Cont
Peng L, Roell A, 2008, Manipulation and equity-based compensation, 120th Annual Meeting of the American-Economic-Association, Publisher: AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC, Pages: 285-290, ISSN: 0002-8282
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- Citations: 62
Peng L, Roeell A, 2008, Executive pay and shareholder litigation, REVIEW OF FINANCE, Vol: 12, Pages: 141-184, ISSN: 1572-3097
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- Citations: 134
Becht M, Bolton P, Röell A, 2007, Chapter 12 Corporate Law and Governance, ISBN: 9780444531209
This chapter surveys the theoretical and empirical research on the main mechanisms of corporate law and governance, discusses the main legal and regulatory institutions in different countries, and examines the comparative governance literature. Corporate governance is concerned with the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders and the resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors. A fundamental dilemma of corporate governance emerges from this overview: large shareholder intervention needs to be regulated to guarantee better small investor protection; but this may increase managerial discretion and scope for abuse. Alternative methods of limiting abuse have yet to be proven effective. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Foucault T, Röell A, Sandås P, 2003, Market Making with Costly Monitoring: An Analysis of the SOES Controversy, Review of Financial Studies, Vol: 16, Pages: 345-384, ISSN: 0893-9454
Roell A, Bolton P, Becht M, 2003, Corporate governance and control, Handbook of the Economics of Finance Asset Pricing, Editors: constantanides, harris, stulz, Publisher: Newnes, ISBN: 9780444594730
For those who seek authoritative perspectives and important details, this volume shows how the boundaries of asset pricing have expanded and at the same time have grown sharper and more inclusive.
Pagano M, Röell AA, Zechner J, 2002, The Geography of Equity Listing: Why Do Companies List Abroad?, The Journal of Finance, Vol: 57, Pages: 2651-2694, ISSN: 0022-1082
<jats:p>This paper documents aggregate trends in the foreign listings of companies, and analyzes their distinctive prelisting characteristics and postlisting performance. In 1986–1997, many European companies listed abroad, mainly on U.S. exchanges, while the number of U.S. companies listed in Europe decreased. European companies that cross‐list tend to be large and recently privatized firms, and expand their foreign sales after listing abroad. They differ sharply depending on where they cross‐list: The U.S. exchanges attract high‐tech and export‐oriented companies that expand rapidly without significant leveraging. Companies cross‐listing within Europe do not grow unusually fast, and increase their leverage after cross‐listing.</jats:p>
Pagano M, Röell AA, Zechner J, 2000, The Geography of Equity Listing: Why Do European Companies List Abroad?, SSRN Electronic Journal
Pagano M, Roell A, 1998, The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol: 113, Pages: 187-225, ISSN: 0033-5533
Pagano M, Roell A, 1996, Transparency and liquidity: A comparison of auction and dealer markets with informed trading, 1991 CEPR/ESF Network in Financial Markets Summer Workshop, Publisher: AMER FINANCE ASSN, Pages: 579-611, ISSN: 0022-1082
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- Citations: 185
PAGANO M, ROELL A, 1992, AUCTION AND DEALERSHIP MARKETS - WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE, 6TH ANNUAL CONGRESS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOC, Publisher: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV, Pages: 613-623, ISSN: 0014-2921
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- Citations: 25
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