Imperial College London
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Dr Andre Veiga

Business School

Assistant Professor of Economics
 
 
 
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Contact

 

+44 (0)20 7594 7957a.veiga Website

 
 
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Location

 

CAGB 484Business School BuildingSouth Kensington Campus

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Summary

 

Publications

Citation

BibTex format

@article{Raposo:2018:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.12.009,
author = {Raposo, Osorio Veiga A},
doi = {10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.12.009},
journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organization},
pages = {114--126},
title = {A note on how to sell a network good},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.12.009},
volume = {59},
year = {2018}
}
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RIS format (EndNote, RefMan)

TY  - JOUR
AB  - I consider a monopolist in an industry with positive network externalities. The firm can screen heterogeneous consumers by offering multiple products. Screening captures a greater share of consumer surplus but also segregates consumers into multiple products, thereby lowering the total network surplus. Thus, screening is socially inefficient. I show screening is never profit maximizing: the monopolist offers a single product, but at an excessive price. Thus, excessive consumer segregation is unlikely to occur in industries such as online multiplayer games, financial exchanges and messaging software.
AU  - Raposo,Osorio Veiga A
DO  - 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.12.009
EP  - 126
PY  - 2018///
SN  - 0167-7187
SP  - 114
TI  - A note on how to sell a network good
T2  - International Journal of Industrial Organization
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.12.009
UR  - https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718718300195?via%3Dihub
UR  - http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/75950
VL  - 59
ER  -
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