Imperial College London
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Dr Andre Veiga

Business School

Assistant Professor of Economics
 
 
 
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Contact

 

+44 (0)20 7594 7957a.veiga Website

 
 
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Location

 

CAGB 484Business School BuildingSouth Kensington Campus

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Summary

 

Publications

Citation

BibTex format

@unpublished{Mahoney:2014:10.2139/ssrn.2484738,
author = {Mahoney, N and Veiga, A and Weyl, EG},
doi = {10.2139/ssrn.2484738},
publisher = {SSRN},
title = {Competition policy in selection markets},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2484738},
year = {2014}
}
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RIS format (EndNote, RefMan)

TY  - UNPB
AB  - Selection markets, like insurance and finance, where the value of customers depends on their identity, create fundamental challenges for competition policy. Competition is often harmful in these markets either by creating socially excessive supply or leading to degradation of product quality. Standard indicators used to gauge policies, such as upward pricing pressure, are also often mis-calibrated in these settings. We summarize for a policy audience and draw competition policy conclusions from two recent papers on the interaction between competition policy and selection, using calibrations to sub-prime auto lending and health insurance.
AU  - Mahoney,N
AU  - Veiga,A
AU  - Weyl,EG
DO  - 10.2139/ssrn.2484738
PB  - SSRN
PY  - 2014///
TI  - Competition policy in selection markets
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2484738
UR  - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2484738
UR  - http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/77519
ER  -
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