Imperial College London
Portrait Picture

Prof David Angeli

Faculty of Engineering, Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Professor of Nonlinear Network Dynamics
 
 
 
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Contact

 

+44 (0)20 7594 6283d.angeli Website

 
 
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Location

 

1107CElectrical EngineeringSouth Kensington Campus

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Summary

 

Publications

Citation

BibTex format

@inbook{Papadaskalopoulos:2020:10.1007/978-3-030-47929-9_13,
author = {Papadaskalopoulos, D and Fan, Y and De, Paola A and Moreno, R and Strbac, G and Angeli, D},
booktitle = {Lecture Notes in Energy},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-47929-9_13},
pages = {381--414},
title = {Game-theoretic modeling of merchant transmission investments},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47929-9_13},
year = {2020}
}
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RIS format (EndNote, RefMan)

TY  - CHAP
AB  - Merchant transmission investment planning has recently emerged as a promising alternative or complement to the traditional centralized planning paradigm and it is considered as a further step toward the deregulation and liberalization of the electricity industry. However, its widespread application requires addressing two fundamental research questions: which entities are likely to undertake merchant transmission investments and whether this planning paradigm can maximize social welfare as the traditional centralized paradigm. Unfortunately, previously proposed approaches to quantitatively model this new planning paradigm do not comprehensively capture the strategic behavior and decision-making interactions between multiple merchant investors. This Chapter proposes a novel non-cooperative game-theoretic modeling framework to capture these realistic aspects of merchant transmission investments and provide insightful answers to the above research questions. More specifically, two different models, both based on non-cooperative game theory, have been developed. The first model addresses the first research question by adopting an equilibrium programming approach. The decision-making problem of each merchant investing player is formulated as a bi-level optimization problem, accounting for the impacts of its own actions on locational marginal prices (LMP) as well as the actions of all competing players. This problem is solved after converting it to a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). An iterative diagonalization method is employed to search for the likely outcome of the strategic interactions between multiple players, i.e., Nash equilibria (NE) of the game. Case studies on a simple 2-node system demonstrate that merchant networks investments will be mostly undertaken by generation companies in areas with low LMP and demand companies in areas with high LMP, as apart from collecting congestion revenue they also increase their energy surpluses. These
AU  - Papadaskalopoulos,D
AU  - Fan,Y
AU  - De,Paola A
AU  - Moreno,R
AU  - Strbac,G
AU  - Angeli,D
DO  - 10.1007/978-3-030-47929-9_13
EP  - 414
PY  - 2020///
SP  - 381
TI  - Game-theoretic modeling of merchant transmission investments
T1  - Lecture Notes in Energy
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47929-9_13
ER  -
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