Imperial College London
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DrDarioPaccagnan

Faculty of Engineering, Department of Computing

Senior Lecturer
 
 
 
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Contact

 

d.paccagnan Website

 
 
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Location

 

Electrical EngineeringSouth Kensington Campus

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Summary

 

Publications

Citation

BibTex format

@inproceedings{Chandan:2019:10.1145/3338506.3340239,
author = {Chandan, R and Paccagnan, D and Ferguson, BL and Marden, JR},
doi = {10.1145/3338506.3340239},
pages = {1--1},
publisher = {ACM Press},
title = {Computing optimal taxes in atomic congestion games},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3338506.3340239},
year = {2019}
}
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RIS format (EndNote, RefMan)

TY  - CPAPER
AB  - When the performance of a system is dictated by the behaviour of its users, self-interested choices can result in sub-optimal system operation, as is the case in road traffic networks. The inefficiency resulting from such selfish behaviour is commonly measured by the ratio between the emergent worst-case system cost and the minimum system cost, termed price-of-anarchy. As the degree of inefficiency can be significant even for relatively simple systems (e.g., affine congestion games), researchers have proposed a variety of approaches to align the emergent selfish behaviour with the desired system objective. A well-studied and promising method is that of altering users' perceived costs by means of taxes.
AU  - Chandan,R
AU  - Paccagnan,D
AU  - Ferguson,BL
AU  - Marden,JR
DO  - 10.1145/3338506.3340239
EP  - 1
PB  - ACM Press
PY  - 2019///
SP  - 1
TI  - Computing optimal taxes in atomic congestion games
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3338506.3340239
UR  - https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3338506.3340239
ER  -
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