Publications
123 results found
Gale DM, Allen F, 2000, Corporate governance and product market competition, Corporate Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, Editors: Vives, Cambridge, Publisher: Cambridge University Press, ISBN: 9780521781640
Allen F, Gale D, 2000, Financial contagion, JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol: 108, Pages: 1-33, ISSN: 0022-3808
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- Citations: 1623
Allen F, Gale D, 2000, Bubbles and crises, Conference on the Origins and Management of Financial Crises, Publisher: WILEY-BLACKWELL, Pages: 236-255, ISSN: 0013-0133
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- Citations: 281
Allen F, Gale D, 2000, Corporate governance and competition, Conference on New Ideas in Corporate Governance, Publisher: CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS, Pages: 23-94
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- Citations: 135
Allen F, Gale D, 1999, Bubbles, crises, and policy, OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, Vol: 15, Pages: 9-18, ISSN: 0266-903X
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- Citations: 53
Allen F, Gale D, 1999, Innovations in financial services, relationships, and risk sharing, MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, Vol: 45, Pages: 1239-1253, ISSN: 0025-1909
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- Citations: 32
Allen F, Gale D, 1999, The Asian crisis and the process of financial contagion, Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol: 7, Pages: 243-249, ISSN: 1358-1988
<jats:p>Economists have believed for a long time that financial systems are fragile in the sense that small shocks can cause serious disruption. Research has focused on phenomena, such as bank runs, which affect the stability of individual institutions. Only recently has there been interest in the phenomenon of contagion, in which financial distress in one institution or one sector of the financial system spreads to other institutions or sectors. The crises in South‐East Asia in 1997 and Russia in 1998 have provoked speculation that financial crises have spread from one country to another. This paper reviews a number of possible hypotheses about the process of financial contagion and relates them to recent events in emerging markets.</jats:p>
Allen F, Karjalainen R, 1999, Using genetic algorithms to find technical trading rules, JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, Vol: 51, Pages: 245-271, ISSN: 0304-405X
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- Citations: 418
Allen F, 1999, The design of financial systems and markets, JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, Vol: 8, Pages: 5-7, ISSN: 1042-9573
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- Citations: 7
Allen F, Gale D, 1999, Diversity of opinion and financing of new technologies, Symposium on Financial System Design, Publisher: ACADEMIC PRESS INC, Pages: 68-89, ISSN: 1042-9573
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- Citations: 158
Phillips RD, Cummins JD, Allen F, 1998, Financial pricing of insurance in the multiple-line insurance company, JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE, Vol: 65, Pages: 597-636, ISSN: 0022-4367
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- Citations: 106
Allen F, Gale D, 1998, Optimal financial crises, 58th Annual Meeting of the American-Finance-Association, Publisher: BLACKWELL PUBLISHERS, Pages: 1245-1284, ISSN: 0022-1082
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- Citations: 332
Allen F, Santomero AM, 1997, The theory of financial intermediation, JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE, Vol: 21, Pages: 1461-1485, ISSN: 0378-4266
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- Citations: 235
Allen F, Gale D, 1997, Financial markets, intermediaries, and intertemporal smoothing, JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol: 105, Pages: 523-546, ISSN: 0022-3808
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- Citations: 168
Gale DM, Allen F, 1996, Universal Banking, Intertemporal Risk Smoothing, and European Financial Integration, Universal Banking: Financial System Design Reconsidered, Editors: Saunders, Walter, New York, Publisher: Irwin
ALLEN F, KARJALAINEN R, 1995, USING GENETIC ALGORITHMS TO FIND TECHNICAL TRADING RULES, JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Vol: 50, Pages: 945-946, ISSN: 0022-1082
ALLEN F, 1995, THAKOR AND WILSON - COMMENT, JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE, Vol: 19, Pages: 717-718, ISSN: 0378-4266
ALLEN F, GALE D, 1995, A WELFARE COMPARISON OF INTERMEDIARIES AND FINANCIAL-MARKETS IN GERMANY AND THE US, Symposium on Financial Intermediation, at the CEPR, Fundacion-Banco-Bilbao-Vizcaya Conference on Industrial Organization and Finance, Publisher: ELSEVIER, Pages: 179-209, ISSN: 0014-2921
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- Citations: 104
ALLEN F, GALE D, 1994, LIMITED MARKET PARTICIPATION AND VOLATILITY OF ASSET PRICES, AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol: 84, Pages: 933-955, ISSN: 0002-8282
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- Citations: 236
Gale DM, Allen F, 1994, Financial Innovation: An Overview, Financial Innovation and Risk Sharing, Editors: Allen, Gale, Cambridge, MA, Publisher: MIT Press (MA)
ALLEN F, 1993, SECURITY DESIGN SPECIAL ISSUE - INTRODUCTION, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Vol: 22, Pages: 32-33, ISSN: 0046-3892
ALLEN F, 1993, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL-MARKETS, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, Vol: 14, Pages: 11-22, ISSN: 0143-2095
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- Citations: 51
ALLEN F, 1993, ESTIMATING DIVISIONAL COST OF CAPITAL FOR INSURANCE COMPANIES, Symposium on Life Insurance Company Financial Management, Publisher: KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS, Pages: 101-123
Allen F, Gale D, 1992, Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts, Economic Theory, Vol: 2, Pages: 1-26, ISSN: 0938-2259
Theory suggests that optimal contracts should include many contingencies to achieve optimal risk sharing. However, in practice, few contracts are as complex as theory suggests. This paper develops a model which is consistent with this observation. The lack of risk sharing results from the interplay of two factors. First, contingencies must be based on information produced by measurement systems, which may be manipulable. Second, when two parties to a contract meet, they often have incomplete information. The type of contract offered may reveal information about the party who proposes it. Different types of agents have different preferences over contingent contracts, because they have different abilities to manipulate the measurement system. These differences in preferences allow the parties to signal their types through the contracts they offer. Noncontingent contracts may be chosen in equilibrium because they are the only contracts which do not give any type an incentive to distort the measurement system and, hence, do not reveal information about the party proposing the contract. © 1992 Springer-Verlag.
ALLEN F, GALE D, 1992, STOCK-PRICE MANIPULATION, REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, Vol: 5, Pages: 503-529, ISSN: 0893-9454
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- Citations: 258
ALLEN F, GALE D, 1991, ARBITRAGE, SHORT SALES, AND FINANCIAL INNOVATION, ECONOMETRICA, Vol: 59, Pages: 1041-1068, ISSN: 0012-9682
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- Citations: 68
Allen F, Gale D, 1990, Incomplete markets and incentives to set up an options exchange, The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Vol: 15, Pages: 17-46, ISSN: 0926-4957
Traditional analyses with incomplete markets take the securities that are traded as exogenous. In this paper we endogenize the market structure by considering incentives to introduce (costly) options exchanges which issue derivative securities. The method of financing the exchange is critical in determining whether the market structure is socially efficient. If the exchange can charge fees to all agents and make every agent's participation a necessary condition for establishing the exchange then the market structure chosen in equilibrium is efficient. However, if either of these conditions is not satisfied then an inefficient market structure may be chosen. © 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
ALLEN F, 1990, FINANCIAL-MARKETS AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION - FRONTIERS OF MODERN FINANCIAL THEORY, VOL 2 - BHATTACHARYA,S, CONSTANTINIDES,GM, REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, Vol: 3, Pages: 309-313, ISSN: 0893-9454
Allen F, Gale D, 1988, Optimal Security Design, REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, Vol: 1, Pages: 229-263, ISSN: 0893-9454
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- Citations: 117
ALLEN F, FAULHABER GR, 1988, OPTIMISM INVITES DECEPTION, QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Vol: 103, Pages: 397-407, ISSN: 0033-5533
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- Citations: 12
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