Imperial College London

ProfessorGillesChemla

Business School

Professor of Finance
 
 
 
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Contact

 

+44 (0)20 7594 9161g.chemla Website

 
 
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Assistant

 

Ms Moira Rankin +44 (0)20 7594 9113

 
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Location

 

3.0453 Prince's GateSouth Kensington Campus

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Summary

 

Publications

Citation

BibTex format

@unpublished{Ljungqvist:2007,
author = {Ljungqvist, A and Habib, MA and Chemla, G},
title = {An Analysis of Shareholder Agreements.},
year = {2007}
}

RIS format (EndNote, RefMan)

TY  - UNPB
AB - Shareholder agreements govern the relations among shareholders in privately held firms, such as joint ventures and venture capital-backed companies. We provide an economic explanation for key clauses in such agreements—namely, put and call options, tag-along and drag-along rights, demand and piggy-back rights, and catch-up clauses. In a dynamic moral hazard setting, we show that these clauses can ensure that the contract parties make efficient ex ante investments in the firm. They do so by constraining renegotiation. In the absence of the clauses, ex ante investment would be distorted by unconstrained renegotiation aimed at (i) precluding value-destroying ex post transfers, (ii) inducing value-increasing ex post investments, or (iii) precluding hold-out on value-increasing sales to a trade buyer or the IPO market.
AU - Ljungqvist,A
AU - Habib,MA
AU - Chemla,G
PY - 2007///
TI - An Analysis of Shareholder Agreements.
ER -