7 results found
Du L, Hu M, Wu J, 2021, Sales effort management under all-or-nothing constraint, Management Science, ISSN: 0025-1909
We consider a sales effort management problem under an all-or-nothing constraint. The seller will receive no bonus/revenue if the sales volume fails to reach a predetermined sales target at the end of the sales horizon. Throughout the sales horizon, the sales process can be moderated by the seller through her costly effort. We show that the optimal sales rate is non-monotone with respect to the remaining time or the outstanding sales volume required to reach the target. Generally, it has a water shed structure that for any needed sales volume, there exists a cut off point on the remaining time above which the optimal sales rate decreases in the remaining time and below which it increases in the remaining time. We then study easy-to-compute heuristics that can be implemented efficiently. We start with a static heuristic derived from the deterministic analog of the stochastic problem. With an all-or-nothing constraint, we show that the performance of the static heuristic hinges on how the profit-maximizing rate fares against the target rate, which is defined as the sales target divided by the length of the sales horizon. When the profit-maximizing rate is higher than the target rate, the static heuristic adopting the optimal deterministic rate is asymptotically optimal with negligible loss. On the other hand, when the profit-maximizing rate is lower than the target rate, the performance loss of any asymptotically optimal static heuristic is of an order greater than the square root of the scale parameter. To address the poor performance of the static heuristic for the latter case, we propose a modified resolving heuristic and show that it is asymptotically optimal, and achieves a logarithmic performance loss.
Valletti T, Wu J, 2020, Consumer profiling with data requirements: structure and policy implications, Production and Operations Management, Vol: 29, Pages: 309-329, ISSN: 1059-1478
We consider a model where a monopolist can profile consumers in order to price discriminate among them, and consumers can take costly actions to protect their identities and make the profiling technology less effective. A novel aspect of the model consists in the profiling technology: the signal that the monopolist gets about a consumer’s willingness‐to‐pay can be made more accurate either by having more consumers revealing their identities, or by spending larger amounts of money (e.g., on third‐party complementary data or data analytics capabilities). We show that both consumer surplus and social welfare are convex in the ability of consumers to conceal their identities. The interest of this result stems from the fact that consumers’ concealing cost can be interpreted as a policy tool: a stricter privacy law would make the concealing cost lower, and vice‐versa. Consequently, a policymaker who promotes total welfare should either make data protection very easy or very costly. The right direction of data regulations depends on data requirements. In particular, a higher (lower) data requirement is an instance when more (less) consumers are needed to achieve the same signal precision. We show that a strict data privacy law is preferable under a high data requirement so that firms are less likely to invest in profiling inefficiently, whereas there is less concern with little or no data regulations under a low data requirement. We also discuss when greater data protection may be beneficial to the firm.
Hu M, Shi M, Wu J, 2019, Online Group Buying and Crowdfunding: Two cases of All-or-Nothing Mechanisms, Sharing Economy - Making Supply Meet Demand, Editors: Hu, Publisher: Springer, ISBN: 9783030018634
Hu M, Milner J, Wu J, 2016, Liking and following and the newsvendor: Operations and marketing policies under social influence, Management Science, Vol: 62, Pages: 867-879, ISSN: 0025-1909
We consider a monopolistic firm selling two substitutable products to a stream of sequential arrivals whose purchase decisions can be influenced by earlier purchases. Before demand realizes, the firm faces a newsvendor problem for the two products with economies of scale in production for each. When consumers are responsive to others’ decisions, social influence amplifies demand uncertainty, leading to a lower profit for the firm. We propose three solutions for the firm to better cope with or even benefit from social influence: influencer recruitment and a reduced product assortment either before demand realization (ex ante) or under production postponement (ex post). First, the firm can offer promotional incentives to recruit consumers as influencers. We reveal an operational benefit of influencer marketing that a very small fraction of such influencers is sufficient to diminish sales’ unpredictability. Second, as the potential substitutability between products increases due to social influence, the firm may leverage the increased substitutability and enjoy lower cost in production by reducing product assortment before demand realization. Last, under production postponement, the firm can take advantage of the way that social influence results in demand herding and reduce product varieties by reacting to preorder information.
Wu J, Shi M, Hu M, 2015, Threshold effects in online group buying, Management Science, Vol: 61, Pages: 2025-2040, ISSN: 1526-5501
This paper studies two types of threshold-induced effects: a surge of new sign-ups around the time when the thresholds of group-buying deals are reached, and a stronger positive relation between the number of new sign-ups and the cumulative number of sign-ups before the thresholds are reached than afterward. This empirical study uses a data set that records the intertemporal cumulative number of sign-ups for group-buying deals in 86 city markets covered by Groupon, during a period of 71 days when Groupon predominantly used “a deal a day” format for each local market and posted the number of sign-ups in real time. We find that the first type of threshold effect is significant in all product categories and in all markets. The second type of threshold effect varies across product categories and markets. Our results underscore the importance of considering product and market characteristics in threshold design decisions for online group buying.
Hu M, Shi M, Wu J, 2013, Simultaneous vs. Sequential Group-Buying Mechanisms, MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, Vol: 59, Pages: 2805-2822, ISSN: 0025-1909
Wu J, Li B, 2009, Keep Cache Replacement Simple in Peer-Assisted VoD Systems, IEEE INFOCOM Conference 2009, Publisher: IEEE, Pages: 2591-2595, ISSN: 0743-166X
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