5 results found
Valletti T, Wu J, 2020, Consumer profiling with data requirements: Structure and policy implications, Production and Operations Management, Vol: 29, Pages: 309-329, ISSN: 1059-1478
We consider a model where a monopolist can profile consumers in order to price discriminate among them,and consumers can take costly actions to protect their identities and make the profiling technology lesseffective. A novel aspect of the model consists in the profiling technology: the signal that the monopolistgets about a consumer’s willingness-to-pay can be made more accurate either by having more consumersrevealing their identities, or by spending larger amounts of money (e.g., on third-party complementary dataor data analytics capabilities). We show that both consumer surplus and social welfare are convex in theability of consumers to conceal their identities. The interest of this result stems from the fact that consumers’concealing cost can be interpreted as a policy tool: a stricter privacy law would make the concealing costlower, and vice-versa. Consequently, a policymaker who promotes total welfare should either make dataprotection very easy or very costly. The right direction of data regulations depends on data requirements.In particular, a higher (lower) data requirement is an instance when more (less) consumers are needed toachieve the same signal precision. We show that a strict data privacy law is preferable under a high datarequirement so that firms are less likely to invest in profiling inefficiently, whereas there is less concern withlittle or no data regulations under a low data requirement. We also discuss when greater data protectionmay be beneficial to the firm.
Hu M, Shi M, Wu J, 2019, Online Group Buying and Crowdfunding: Two cases of All-or-Nothing Mechanisms, Sharing Economy - Making Supply Meet Demand, Editors: Hu, Publisher: Springer, ISBN: 9783030018634
Hu M, Milner J, Wu J, 2016, Liking and Following and the Newsvendor: Operations and Marketing Policies Under Social Influence, MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, Vol: 62, Pages: 867-879, ISSN: 0025-1909
Wu J, Shi M, Hu M, 2014, Threshold Effects in Online Group Buying, Management Science, Vol: 61, Pages: 2025-2040, ISSN: 1526-5501
This paper studies two types of threshold-induced effects: a surge of new sign-ups around the time when the thresholds of group-buying deals are reached, and a stronger positive relation between the number of new sign-ups and the cumulative number of sign-ups before the thresholds are reached than afterward. This empirical study uses a data set that records the intertemporal cumulative number of sign-ups for group-buying deals in 86 city markets covered by Groupon, during a period of 71 days when Groupon predominantly used “a deal a day” format for each local market and posted the number of sign-ups in real time. We find that the first type of threshold effect is significant in all product categories and in all markets. The second type of threshold effect varies across product categories and markets. Our results underscore the importance of considering product and market characteristics in threshold design decisions for online group buying.
Hu M, Shi M, Wu J, 2013, Simultaneous vs. Sequential Group-Buying Mechanisms, MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, Vol: 59, Pages: 2805-2822, ISSN: 0025-1909
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