Publications
103 results found
Miraldo M, 2009, Economies of scale and scope in the English hospital sector, Economies of scale and scope in the English hospital sector, Publisher: Imperial College Business School, 2009/05
Willis-Owen CA, Brust K, Alsop H, et al., 2009, Unicondylar Knee Arthroplasty in the UK National Health Service: an analysis of candidacy, outcome and cost efficacy., The Knee
Galizzi M, Ghislandi S, Hokkanen J, et al., 2009, Reference pricing in Finnish pharmaceutical markets: pre-policy evaluation, Reports of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Publisher: MINISTRY OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND HEALTH, FINLAND, 25
Mason A, Street A, Miraldo M, et al., 2009, Should prospective payments be differentiated for public and private healthcare providers?, Health Economics, Policy and Law
Miraldo M, 2009, Reference Pricing, firms’ pricing strategies, Journal of Health Economics
Goddard M, Jacobs R, Marini G, et al., 2008, Giving greater financial independence to hospitals: does it make a difference? The case of English NHS Trusts, Health Economics, Vol: 17, Pages: 751-775
In 2003 a new type of provider organisation, the Foundation Trust (FT), was introduced in England, and the best performing NHS hospitals were able to apply for Foundation status. FTs enjoy greater financial flexibility and are subject to less central monitoring and control. The phased introduction of FTs represents an opportunity to examine whether the new financial structures facing FTs have produced any differences in financial performance compared with non-FTs. We use difference in difference methods to examine whether Foundation status had a significant effect on financial management. We find that Foundation status has had a limited impact in terms of acting as an instrument to signal strong financial management of FTs. This result may reflect the relatively early stage of the FT process or may be due to the fact that all types of Trusts are experiencing a challenging financial environment, including the introduction of a prospective payment system. However, we explore the nature of the trends emerging over time and discuss the implications of our findings for policy.
Galizzi M, Miraldo M, 2008, Optimal Contracts and Contractual Arrangements Within the Hospital: Bargaining vs. Take-it-or-leave-it Offers
We study the impact of different contractual arrangements within the hospital on the optimal contractsdesigned by third party payers when severity is hospital's private information. We develop a multi-issuebargaining process between doctors and managers within the hospital. Results are then compared with ascenario where doctors and managers decide independently by maximizing their own profit, with managersproposing to doctors a take-it-or leave-it offer. Results show that, when the cost of capital is sufficiently low,the informational rent arising on information asymmetry is higher in a set up where managers and doctorsdecide together through a strategic bargaining process than when they act as two decision-making units.
Mason A, Miraldo M, Siciliani L, et al., 2008, Establishing a Fair Playing Field for Payment by Results, Report to the Department of Health, UK
Miraldo M, Marini G, Jacobs R, et al., 2007, Foundation Trusts in the NHS? Does more freedom make a difference?, Health Policy Matters
Miraldo M, 2007, Hospital Financing and the Development and Adoption of New Technologies
We study the influence of different reimbursement systems, namely Prospective Payment System, Cost Based Reimbursement System and Mixed Reimbursement System on the development and adoption of different technologies with an endogenous supply of these technologies. We focus our analysis on technology development and adoption under two models: private R&D and R&D withinthe hospital. One of the major findings is that the optimal reimbursement system is a pure Prospective Payment System or a Mixed Reimbursement System depending on the market structure.
Miraldo M, 2007, Reference Pricing Versus Co-Payment in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Firm's Pricing Strategies
Within a horizontally differentiation model and allowing for heterogeneous qualities, we analyze the effects of reference pricing reimbursement on firms’ pricing strategies. With this analysis we find inherent incentives for firms’ pricing behaviour, and consequently we shed some light on time consistency of such policy. The analysis encompasses different reference price rules. Results show that if drugs have equal quality, reference pricing may lead to higher prices. With quality differentiation both the minimum and linear policies unambiguously lead to higher prices.
Miraldo M, 2007, Reference Pricing Versus Co-Payment in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Price, Quality and Market Coverage
Within a horizontally differentiation model, we analyse the relative effects of reference pricing and copayment reimbursement on firms pricing and quality strategies as well as on market coverage under different market structures: competitive market, local monopolies and exogenous full market coverage. Results allow us to shed some light on the welfare and total drug expenditure implications of different drug reimbursement policies.
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