Imperial College London

DrMirabelleMuuls

Business School

Assistant Professor in Economics
 
 
 
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Contact

 

+44 (0)20 7594 9059m.muuls CV

 
 
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Location

 

CAGB483City and Guilds BuildingSouth Kensington Campus

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Summary

 

Publications

Publication Type
Year
to

36 results found

Martin R, De Haas R, Muûls M, Schweiger Het al., 2022, Managerial and Financial Barriers during the Green Transition

Working paper

Colmer J, Martin R, Muûls M, Wagner UJet al., 2022, Does Pricing Carbon Mitigate Climate Change? Firm-Level Evidence from the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme

Working paper

Dechezleprêtre A, Gennaioli C, Martin R, Muûls M, Stoerk Tet al., 2021, Searching for carbon leaks in multinational companies, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol: 112, ISSN: 0095-0696

Does a unilateral climate change policy cause companies to shift the location of production, thereby creating carbon leakage? In this paper, we analyze the effect of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) on the geographic distribution of carbon emissions by multinational companies. The empirical evidence is based on unique data for the period 2007-2014 from the Carbon Disclosure Project, which tracks the emissions of multinational businesses by geographic region within each company. Because they already operate from multiple locations, multinational firms should be the most prone to carbon leakage. Our data includes the regional emissions of 1,122 companies, of which 261 are subject to EU ETS regulation. We find no evidence that the EU ETS has led to a displacement of carbon emissions from Europe toward the rest of the world, including to countries with lax climate policies and within energy-intensive companies. A large number of robustness checks confirm this finding. Overall, the paper suggests that modest differences in carbon prices between countries do not induce carbon leakage.

Journal article

Trask A, Wills K, Green T, Staffell I, Auvermann O, Coutellier Q, Muuls M, Hardy J, Morales Rodriguez D, Martin R, Sivakumar A, Pawlak J, Faghih Imani SA, Strbac G, Badesa Bernardo Let al., 2021, Impacts of COVID-19 on the Energy System, Impacts of COVID-19 on the Energy System

This Briefing Paper explores the impactthe COVID-19 pandemic had on the UK’senergy sector over the course of thefirst government-mandated nationallockdown that began on 23 March 2020.Research from several aspects of theIntegrated Development of Low-carbonEnergy Systems (IDLES) programme atImperial College London is presented inone overarching paper. The main aim isto determine what lessons can be learntfrom that lockdown period, given theunique set of challenges it presented inour daily lives and the changes it broughtabout in energy demand, supply, anduse. Valuable insights are gained intohow working-from-home policies,electric vehicles, and low-carbon gridscan be implemented, incentivised, andmanaged effectively.

Report

Coutellier Q, Hardy J, Martin R, Muûls Met al., 2021, Homeworking can be Net Positive, Evidence from the UK Lockdown during COVID-19

Working paper

De Haas R, Martin R, Muûls M, Schweiger Het al., 2021, Managerial and Financial Barriers to the Net Zero Transition

Working paper

De Haas R, Martin R, Muûls M, Schweiger Het al., 2021, Managerial and Financial Barriers to the Net-Zero Transition

Working paper

De Haas R, Martin R, Muûls M, Schweiger Het al., 2021, Managerial and Financial Barriers During the Green Transition

Working paper

Yong SK, Wagner UJ, Shen P, Preux LD, Muûls M, Martin R, Cao Jet al., 2021, Management Practices and Climate Policy in China

Working paper

Martin R, Haas RD, Muûls M, Schweiger Het al., 2021, Managerial and Financial Barriers to the Net-Zero Transition

Working paper

Wagner UJ, Kassem D, Gerster A, Jaraite J, Klemetsen ME, Laukkanen M, Martin R, Munch JR, Muûls M, de Preux L, Rosendahl KE, Schusser Set al., 2020, Carbon Footprints of European Manufacturing Jobs: Stylized Facts and Implications for Climate Policy

Working paper

Colmer J, Martin R, Muûls M, Wagner UJet al., 2020, Does pricing carbon mitigate climate change? Firm-level evidence from the European Union emissions trading scheme Acknowledgements

In theory, market-based regulatory instruments correct market failures at least cost. However, evidence on their efficacy remains scarce. We evaluate the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)-the world’s first and largest market-based climate policy. Using administrative data on almost 4,000 French manufacturing firms, we estimate that the EU ETS induced regulated firms to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 8-12% compared to unregulated firms after the Pilot phase, a necessary condition for climate change mitigation. These reductions account for 26% of the concurrent decline in aggregate industrial emission in France. We do not estimate any negative effects on the scale of production; instead we find that firms reduced the emissions intensity of value added by making targeted investments. We find no evidence that firms outsourced production to unregulated firms or markets. Collectively, these findings suggest that the EU ETS induced global emissions reductions, a necessary and sufficient condition for mitigating climate change.

Working paper

Coutellier Q, Gosnell G, Gurguc Z, Martin R, Muuls Met al., 2020, Consumer Driven Virtual Power Plants: A Field Experiment on the Adoption and Use of Prosocial Technologies

Working paper

Chassagneux J-F, Chotai H, Muûls M, 2017, A Forward-Backward SDEs Approach to Pricing in Carbon Markets, Publisher: Springer, ISBN: 9783319631158

In this chapter, we consider a model for the valuation of carbon emissions market allowances. In each year from 2006 to 2011 inclusive, combustion installations accounted for between 72 and 75% of verified emissions under the EU ETS (Emissions Trading System), see Fig. 3.1. It is reasonable to assume that most of these installations are involved in electricity generation. Given the importance of power producers in such markets, the model focuses on the electricity generation sector.

Book

Alberts G, Gurguc Z, Koutroumpis P, Martin R, Muuls M, Napp Tet al., 2016, Competition and norms: a self-defeating combination?, Energy Policy, Vol: 96, Pages: 504-523, ISSN: 1873-6777

This paper investigates the effects of information feedback mechanisms on electricity and heating usage at a student hall of residence in London. In a randomised control trial, we formulate different treatments such as feedback information and norms, as well as prize competition among subjects. We show that information and norms lead to a sharp – more than 20% - reduction in overall energy consumption. Because participants do not pay for their energy consumption this response cannot be driven by cost saving incentives. Interestingly, when combining feedback and norms with a prize competition for achieving low energy consumption, the reduction effect – while present initially – disappears in the long run. This could suggest that external rewards reduce and even destroy intrinsic motivation to change behaviour.

Journal article

Martin R, Muuls M, Wagner U, 2016, The impact of the European Union Emissions Trade Scheme on regulated firms: what is the evidence after ten years?, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Vol: 10, Pages: 129-148, ISSN: 1750-6824

This article reviews the recent literature on ex post evaluation of the impacts of the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) on regulated firms in the industrial and power sectors. We summarize the findings from original research papers concerning three broadly defined impacts: carbon dioxide emissions, economic performance and competitiveness, and innovation. We conclude by highlighting gaps in the current literature and suggesting priorities for future research on this landmark policy. ( JEL : Q52, Q54, Q58)

Journal article

Muuls M, 2015, Exporters, importers and credit constraints, Journal of International Economics, Vol: 95, Pages: 333-343, ISSN: 1873-0353

This paper analyzes the interaction between credit constraints and trading behavior, decomposing trade in extensive and intensive margins. I construct a unique dataset containing firm-level trade transaction data, balance sheets and credit scores from an independent credit insurance company for Belgian manufacturing firms between 1999 and 2007. Firms are more likely to be exporting or importing if they enjoy lower credit constraints. Also, firms that have better credit rating export and import more. Importing and exporting behaviors differ in how both the level and growth of the various margins of trade are related to credit constraints in one important dimension. In the case of exports, it is the intensive and extensive margins of exports in terms of both product and destinations that are significantly associated with credit constraints whereas for imports it is the extensive margin in terms of products only.

Journal article

Martin R, Muuls M, Wagner UJ, 2015, Trading Behavior in the EU ETS, Workshop on Emissions Trading as Climate Policy Instruments - Evaluation and Prospects, Publisher: MIT PRESS, Pages: 213-238

Conference paper

Martin R, Dechezleprêtre A, Gennaioli C, Muûls Met al., 2014, Searching for carbon leaks in multinational companies, Publisher: Imperial College Business School

Working paper

Martin R, Muûls M, de Preux LB, Wagner UJet al., 2014, On the empirical content of carbon leakage criteria in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, Ecological Economics, Vol: 105, Pages: 78-88, ISSN: 0921-8009

The EU Emissions Trading Scheme continues to exempt industries deemed at risk of carbon leakage from permit auctions. Carbon leakage risk is established based on the carbon intensity and trade exposure of each 4-digit industry. Using a novel measure of carbon leakage risk obtained in interviews with almost 400 managers at regulated firms in six countries, we show that carbon intensity is strongly correlated with leakage risk whereas overall trade exposure is not. In spite of this, most exemptions from auctioning are granted to industries with high trade exposure to developed and less developed countries. Our analysis suggests two ways of tightening the exemption criteria without increasing relocation risk among non-exempt industries. The first one is to exempt trade exposed industries only if they are also carbon intensive. The second one is to consider exposure to trade only with less developed countries. By modifying the carbon leakage criteria along these lines, European governments could raise additional revenue from permit auctions of up to €3 billion per year, based on a permit price of €30.

Journal article

Martin R, Muûls M, de Preux LB, Wagner UJet al., 2014, Industry compensation under relocation risk: a firm-level analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, The American Economic Review, Vol: 104, Pages: 2482-2508, ISSN: 0002-8282

When regulated firms are offered compensation to prevent them from relocating, efficiency requires that payments be distributed across firms so as to equalize marginal relocation probabilities, weighted by the damage caused by relocation. We formalize this fundamental economic logic and apply it to analyzing compensation rules proposed under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, where emission permits are allocated free of charge to carbon intensive and trade exposed industries. We show that this practice results in substantial overcompensation for given carbon leakage risk. Efficient permit allocation reduces the aggregate risk of job loss by more than half without increasing aggregate compensation.

Journal article

Muuls M, Martin R, Wagner UJ, de Preux Let al., 2014, Problematic Permitting - Editor's choice

Other

Martin R, Muûls M, Wagner UJ, 2013, The Impact of the EU ETS on Regulated Firms: What is the Evidence After Eight Years?

Working paper

Muûls M, Petropoulou D, 2013, A swing state theory of trade protection in the Electoral College, Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol: 46, Pages: 705-724

This paper analyzes trade policy determination in the Electoral College in the presence of swing voters. It determines the circumstances under which incumbent politicians have an incentive to build a reputation for protectionism, thus swaying voting decisions and improving their reelection probability. Strategic trade protection is shown to be more likely when protectionist swing voters have a lead over free trade supporters in states with relatively strong electoral competition and in states representing a larger proportion of Electoral College votes. An empirical test using a measure of industrial concentration in swing and decisive U.S. states lends support to the theoretical findings.

Journal article

Gennaioli C, Martin R, Muuls M, 2013, Using micro data to examine causal effects of climate policy, Handbook on Energy and Climate Change

Book chapter

Martin M, Muuls M, 2011, The sensitivity of UK manufacturing firms to extreme weather events

Report

Anderson B, Leib J, Martin R, McGuigan M, Muuls M, de Preux L, Wagner Uet al., 2011, Climate change policy and business in Europe: evidence from interviewing managers

Working paper

Martin R, Muûls M, Preux LBD, Wagner UJet al., 2011, Anatomy of a paradox: Management practices, organizational structure and energy efficiency, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Pages: ---, ISSN: 0095-0696

Journal article

Martin R, Muûls M, Wagner UJ, 2010, Europe's emissions trading scheme: taxpayers versus sthe industry lobby

The European Commission plans to tighten the greenhouse gas emissions targets in the Emissions Trading System. Ralf Martin and colleagues examine the likely impact on affected businesses, and conclude that industry is exploiting concerns about competitiveness to obtain free emission permits according to criteria that are too lax.

Working paper

Martin R, Muûls M, Wagner UJ, 2010, Still time to Reclaim The European Union Emissions Trading System for the European Tax Payer

The criteria proposed by the EU Commission to identify industries that will receive free emission permits in the third phase of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) are not restrictive enough. Evidence from interviews with almost 800 managers in Europe shows that most of the sectors entitled to free emission permits are not facing an increased risk of closure or relocation outside of the EU as a consequence of permit auctioning. Free permit allocation is therefore just a transfer of tax payers' money to industry without any additional social benefit. We propose a simple modification of the Commission's criteria for free permit allocation which could save European tax payers at least €7 billion annually.

Working paper

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