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@article{Muûls:2013,
author = {Muûls, M and Petropoulou, D},
journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics},
pages = {705--724},
title = {A swing state theory of trade protection in the Electoral College},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/cje/issued/v46y2013i2p705-724.html},
volume = {46},
year = {2013}
}

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RIS format (EndNote, RefMan)

TY  - JOUR
AB  - This paper analyzes trade policy determination in the Electoral College in the presence of swing voters. It determines the circumstances under which incumbent politicians have an incentive to build a reputation for protectionism, thus swaying voting decisions and improving their reelection probability. Strategic trade protection is shown to be more likely when protectionist swing voters have a lead over free trade supporters in states with relatively strong electoral competition and in states representing a larger proportion of Electoral College votes. An empirical test using a measure of industrial concentration in swing and decisive U.S. states lends support to the theoretical findings.
AU  - Muûls,M
AU  - Petropoulou,D
EP  - 724
PY  - 2013///
SP  - 705
TI  - A swing state theory of trade protection in the Electoral College
T2  - Canadian Journal of Economics
UR  - http://ideas.repec.org/a/cje/issued/v46y2013i2p705-724.html
VL  - 46
ER  -

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