Publications
113 results found
Green RJ, Evans J, 2003, Why did British electricity prices fall after 1998?
In an attempt to reduce high electricity prices in England and Wales the government has reduced concentration among generators and introduced New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA). Econometric analysis on monthly data from April 1996 to September 2002 implies support for two conflicting hypotheses. On a static view, increases in competition and the capacity margin were chiefly responsible for the fall in prices. If generators had been tacitly colluding before NETA, however, the impending change in market rules might have changed their behaviour a few months before the abolition of the Pool. That view implies that NETA reduced prices.
Green RJ, 2003, Failing electricity markets: should we shoot the Pools?, Utilities Policy, Vol: 11, Pages: 155-167, ISSN: 0957-1787
Green R, 2002, Retail Competition and Electricity Contracts
Long-term contracts for electricity can counter market power and reduce prices in short-term markets. If electricity retailers face competition, however, companies signing long-term contracts are exposed to the risk that a fall in short-term prices would allow rivals to buy on the spot market and undercut them. This paper combines a model of electricity retailing and a Cournot model of competition in the wholesale markets to show that if retailers are sufficiently risk-averse, their reluctance to sign long-term contracts could cause a sizeable increase in prices.
Blumstein C, Friedman L, Green RJ, 2002, The History of Electricity Restructuring in California, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade: from theory to policy, Vol: 2, Pages: 9-38
Green R, 2001, Markets for electricity in Europe, OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, Vol: 17, Pages: 329-345, ISSN: 0266-903X
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- Citations: 8
Green R, 2000, Competition in generation: The economic foundations, PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE, Vol: 88, Pages: 128-139, ISSN: 0018-9219
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- Citations: 46
Green R, 1999, Draining the pool: the reform of electricity trading in England and Wales, ENERGY POLICY, Vol: 27, Pages: 515-525, ISSN: 0301-4215
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- Citations: 17
Green R, Pardina MR, 1999, Resetting price controls for privatized utilities, Publisher: World Bank Publications, ISBN: 9780821343388
This manual provides new economic regulators with practical guidance on how to proceed in this fairly technical new field.Chapters cover:- Revising Price ...
Green R, 1999, The electricity contract market in England and Wales, JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Vol: 47, Pages: 107-124, ISSN: 0022-1821
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- Citations: 168
Green RJ, McDaniel T, 1998, Competition in Electricity Supply: Will "1998" be Worth It?, Fiscal Studies, Vol: 19, Pages: 273-293
Green R, 1998, Electricity deregulation in England and Wales, Editors: Zaccour, Publisher: KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS, Pages: 179-202, ISBN: 0-7923-8134-3
Green R, Newbery DM, 1997, Competition in the electricity industry in England and Wales, OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, Vol: 13, Pages: 27-46, ISSN: 0266-903X
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- Citations: 19
Green RJ, 1997, Electricity Transmission Pricing - An International Comparison, Utilities Policy, Vol: 6, Pages: 177-184
Green RJ, 1997, Electricity Transmission Pricing in England and Wales, Utilities Policy, Vol: 6, Pages: 185-193
Green R, 1996, British electricity spot market, Pacific and Asian Journal of Energy, Vol: 6, Pages: 39-52, ISSN: 0970-3888
The ″Pool″ is the spot market at the heart of the privatized electricity industry in England and Wales. This paper describes the Pool's aims and its rules, and shows that two large generators have market power, which they might exploit to raise prices. It discusses the first five years' experience of the Pool, when it suffered from teething problems and from the effects of the generator's market power. The problems of market power might have been avoided; teething troubles were inevitable; and, on balance, the Pool has performed well.
Green R, 1996, Increasing competition in the British electricity spot market, JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Vol: 44, Pages: 205-216, ISSN: 0022-1821
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- Citations: 165
Newbery DM, Green RJ, 1996, Regulation, Public Ownership and Privatisation of the English Electricity Industry, International Comparisons of Electricity Regulation, Editors: Gilbert, Kahn, Publisher: Cambridge Univ Pr, ISBN: 9780521030779
Between the date of nationalisation in 1948 and privatisation in 1990, the industry ... Regulation, public ownership and privatisation of the English ...
GREEN R, 1995, THE COST OF NUCLEAR-POWER COMPARED WITH ALTERNATIVES TO THE MAGNOX PROGRAM, OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES, Vol: 47, Pages: 513-524, ISSN: 0030-7653
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- Citations: 8
VIEIRA X, GORENSTIN BG, PEREIRA MVF, et al., 1995, MARGINAL PRICING AND SUPPLEMENT COST ALLOCATION IN TRANSMISSION OPEN ACCESS - DISCUSSION, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, Vol: 10, Pages: 1133-1142, ISSN: 0885-8950
Green RJ, Waddams Price C, 1995, Liberalisation and Divestiture in the UK Energy Sector, Fiscal Studies, Vol: 16, Pages: 75-89
Green RJ, Newbery DM, 1993, The Regulation of the Gas Industry: Lessons from Electricity, Fiscal Studies, Vol: 14, Pages: 37-52
GREEN RJ, NEWBERY DM, 1992, COMPETITION IN THE BRITISH ELECTRICITY SPOT MARKET, JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol: 100, Pages: 929-953, ISSN: 0022-3808
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- Citations: 610
Green R, 1991, Reshaping the CEGB. Electricity privatization in the UK, Utilities Policy, Vol: 1, Pages: 245-254, ISSN: 0957-1787
The privatization of the electricity supply industry (ESI) in England and Wales is the most complex that the government has undertaken, for an industry with a turnover of nearly £12 billion has been restructured, and a new market in power stations' output created. This paper outlines the major provisions, which mostly affect the former Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB). Most of the provisions are closely related to optimal pricing rules. The main areas of weakness are that there may not be very much competition between generators, and that the incentives for building new generating capacity may be too weak. © 1991.
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