Imperial College London
Portrait Picture

Dr. Renáta Kosová

Business School

Professor of Economics
 
 
 
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Contact

 

+44 (0)20 7594 2630r.kosova Website CV

 
 
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Location

 

CAGB 418City and Guilds BuildingSouth Kensington Campus

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Summary

 

Publications

Citation

BibTex format

@article{Kosova:2018:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2563,
author = {Kosova, R and Sertsios, G},
doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2016.2563},
journal = {Management Science},
pages = {43--63},
title = {An empirical analysis of self-enforcement mechanisms: evidence from hotel franchising},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2563},
volume = {64},
year = {2018}
}
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RIS format (EndNote, RefMan)

TY  - JOUR
AB  - The relational contracts literature suggests that a principal can improve contract self-enforceability by specifying initial requirements that increase the agent’s ex-post rents. Initial requirements specified in hotel franchise agreements — size and quality-tier of hotel — offer a unique empirical setting to test this. Using proprietary data on 5,547 new franchised hotels and their revenues, we find that hotels far away from their franchisor’s headquarters are larger, more likely to belong to a high-quality tier, and generate higher revenues ex-post. This supports the idea that the agent’s ex-post rents can serve as a substitute to the principal’s monitoring intensity in the mitigation of agency problems. Our findings shed light on how formal contract terms can influence informal (relational) contracts between business partners.
AU  - Kosova,R
AU  - Sertsios,G
DO  - 10.1287/mnsc.2016.2563
EP  - 63
PY  - 2018///
SN  - 1526-5501
SP  - 43
TI  - An empirical analysis of self-enforcement mechanisms: evidence from hotel franchising
T2  - Management Science
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2563
UR  - http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/32335
VL  - 64
ER  -
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