Publications
57 results found
Martin R, De Haas R, Muûls M, et al., 2021, Managerial and Financial Barriers to the Net-Zero Transition
De Haas R, Martin R, Muûls M, et al., 2021, Managerial and Financial Barriers to the Net Zero Transition, EBRD Working Paper
De Haas R, Martin R, Muûls M, et al., 2021, Managerial and Financial Barriers to the Net-Zero Transition
De Haas R, Martin R, Muûls M, et al., 2021, Managerial and Financial Barriers to the Net-Zero Transition
Barker M, Degond P, Martin R, et al., 2021, A mean field game model of firm-level innovation, Publisher: arXiv
Knowledge spillovers occur when a firm researches a new technology and thattechnology is adapted or adopted by another firm, resulting in a social valueof the technology that is larger than the initially predicted private value. Asa result, firms systematically under--invest in research compared with thesocially optimal investment strategy. Understanding the level ofunder--investment, as well as policies to correct it, is an area of activeeconomic research. In this paper, we develop a new model of spillovers, takinginspiration from the available microeconomic data. We prove existence anduniqueness of solutions to the model, and we conduct some initial simulationsto understand how indirect spillovers contribute to the productivity of asector.
Martin R, Haas RD, Muûls M, et al., 2021, Managerial and Financial Barriers to the Net-Zero Transition
Yong SK, Wagner UJ, Shen P, et al., 2021, Management Practices and Climate Policy in China
Wagner UJ, Kassem D, Gerster A, et al., 2020, Carbon Footprints of European Manufacturing Jobs: Stylized Facts and Implications for Climate Policy
Martin R, Unsworth S, Valero A, et al., 2020, Innovation for a strong and sustainable recovery
Colmer J, Martin R, Muûls M, et al., 2020, Does pricing carbon mitigate climate change? Firm-level evidence from the European Union emissions trading scheme Acknowledgements
In theory, market-based regulatory instruments correct market failures at least cost. However, evidence on their efficacy remains scarce. We evaluate the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)-the world’s first and largest market-based climate policy. Using administrative data on almost 4,000 French manufacturing firms, we estimate that the EU ETS induced regulated firms to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 8-12% compared to unregulated firms after the Pilot phase, a necessary condition for climate change mitigation. These reductions account for 26% of the concurrent decline in aggregate industrial emission in France. We do not estimate any negative effects on the scale of production; instead we find that firms reduced the emissions intensity of value added by making targeted investments. We find no evidence that firms outsourced production to unregulated firms or markets. Collectively, these findings suggest that the EU ETS induced global emissions reductions, a necessary and sufficient condition for mitigating climate change.
Coutellier Q, Gosnell G, Gurguc Z, et al., 2020, Consumer Driven Virtual Power Plants: A Field Experiment on the Adoption and Use of Prosocial Technologies
Aghion P, Bénabou R, Martin R, et al., 2020, Environmental Preferences and Technological Choices: Is Market Competition Clean or Dirty?
Martin R, Roulet A, Aghion P, et al., 2020, Environmental Preferences and Technological Choices: Is Market Competition Clean or Dirty?, Publisher: NBER Working Paper No 26921
Gosnell G, Martin R, Muûls M, et al., 2019, Making Smart Meters Smarter the Smart Way
We report first results from a large scale randomized control trial of different forms of energy consumption feedback facilitated by smart meters and smart phone feedback apps. Nearly 40,000 customers of a large energy retailer in the UK were exposed to either very basic feedback apps-i.e. simply giving consumers access to monthly energy consumption-or more advanced feedback involving peer group comparisons as well as dis-aggregation of total electricity consumption. We find that more advanced feedback can lead to an average consumption reduction of nearly 4% (Intent to Treat). Taking into account that a large number of customers never sign in to any feedback apps suggests that the reduction effect among customers that do sign in is up to 12%. The smart meter installation was implemented by different installation firms across our sample and we find the reduction effect only for one customers of one installer who displays higher capabilities along a number of metrics. This could suggest that achieving energy preservation objectives does not only depend on the technology involved but also on the capabilities and skills of firms installing those technologies. In the UK, smart meters are by default installed with In Home Displays (IHD) that provide real time feedback on energy use. Some of the customers in our sample did not receive an IHD and we explore if this had any impact on the consumption reduction effect described above. Customers with (and without) IHD comprise a self-selected sample so we have to be careful in drawing causal conclusions. However, we do not find any evidence that any energy reducing effect is contingent on IHDs.
Criscuolo C, Martin R, Overman H, et al., 2019, Some causal effects of an industrial policy, American Economic Review, Vol: 109, Pages: 48-85, ISSN: 0002-8282
Business support policies designed to raise employment and productivity are ubiquitous around the world. We exploit changes in the area-specific eligibility criteria for a major program to support manufacturing jobs through investment subsidies (Regional Selective Assistance). European state aid rules determine whether a sub-national geographical area is eligible for these subsidies, and we construct instrumental variables for area (and plant) eligibility based on the estimated parameters of these rule changes. We find areas eligible for higher subsidies significantly increase manufacturing jobs and reduce unemployment. An exogenous ten-percentage point increase in an area’s maximum investment subsidy stimulates about a 9% increase in manufacturing employment. The treatment effect exists solely for small firms – large companies appear to “game” the system, accepting subsidies without increasing activity. There are positive effects on investment and employment for incumbent firms but no effect on Total Factor Productivity.
Alberts G, Gurguc Z, Koutroumpis P, et al., 2016, Competition and norms: a self-defeating combination?, Energy Policy, Vol: 96, Pages: 504-523, ISSN: 1873-6777
This paper investigates the effects of information feedback mechanisms on electricity and heating usage at a student hall of residence in London. In a randomised control trial, we formulate different treatments such as feedback information and norms, as well as prize competition among subjects. We show that information and norms lead to a sharp – more than 20% - reduction in overall energy consumption. Because participants do not pay for their energy consumption this response cannot be driven by cost saving incentives. Interestingly, when combining feedback and norms with a prize competition for achieving low energy consumption, the reduction effect – while present initially – disappears in the long run. This could suggest that external rewards reduce and even destroy intrinsic motivation to change behaviour.
Forlani E, Martin R, Mion G, et al., 2016, Unraveling Firms: Demand, Productivity and Markups Heterogeneity
Martin R, Muuls M, Wagner U, 2016, The impact of the European Union Emissions Trade Scheme on regulated firms: what is the evidence after ten years?, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Vol: 10, Pages: 129-148, ISSN: 1750-6824
This article reviews the recent literature on ex post evaluation of the impacts of the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) on regulated firms in the industrial and power sectors. We summarize the findings from original research papers concerning three broadly defined impacts: carbon dioxide emissions, economic performance and competitiveness, and innovation. We conclude by highlighting gaps in the current literature and suggesting priorities for future research on this landmark policy. ( JEL : Q52, Q54, Q58)
Forlani E, Martin R, Mion G, et al., 2016, Unraveling Firms: Demand, Productivity and Markups Heterogeneity
Martin R, Van Reenen J, Elias Einiö E, et al., 2016, Do tax Incentives for Research Increase Firm Innovation? An RD Design for R&D
Martin R, Muuls M, Wagner UJ, 2015, Trading Behavior in the EU ETS, Workshop on Emissions Trading as Climate Policy Instruments - Evaluation and Prospects, Publisher: MIT PRESS, Pages: 213-238
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Dechezlepretre A, Martin R, Mohnen M, 2014, Policy brief: Clean innovation and growth
Martin R, Dechezleprêtre A, Gennaioli C, et al., 2014, Searching for carbon leaks in multinational companies, Publisher: Imperial College Business School
Martin R, Dechezleprêtre A, Mohnen M, 2014, Knowledge spillovers from clean and dirty technologies, Publisher: Imperial College Business School
Martin R, de Preux LB, Wagner UJ, 2014, The impact of a carbon tax on manufacturing: Evidence from microdata, Journal of Public Economics, Vol: 117, Pages: 1-14, ISSN: 0047-2727
We estimate the impact of a carbon tax on manufacturing plants using panel data from the UK production census. Our identification strategy builds on the comparison of outcomes between plants subject to the full tax and plants that paid only 20% of the tax. Exploiting exogenous variation in eligibility for the tax discount, we find that the carbon tax had a strong negative impact on energy intensity and electricity use. No statistically significant impacts are found for employment, revenue or plant exit.
Martin R, Muûls M, de Preux LB, et al., 2014, On the empirical content of carbon leakage criteria in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, Ecological Economics, Vol: 105, Pages: 78-88, ISSN: 0921-8009
Martin R, Muûls M, de Preux LB, et al., 2014, Industry Compensation under Relocation Risk: A Firm-Level Analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, American Economic Review, Vol: 104, Pages: 2482-2508, ISSN: 0002-8282
<jats:p> When regulated firms are offered compensation to prevent them from relocating, efficiency requires that payments be distributed across firms so as to equalize marginal relocation probabilities, weighted by the damage caused by relocation. We formalize this fundamental economic logic and apply it to analyzing compensation rules proposed under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, where emission permits are allocated free of charge to carbon-intensive and trade-exposed industries. We show that this practice results in substantial overcompensation for given carbon leakage risk. Efficient permit allocation reduces the aggregate risk of job loss by more than half without increasing aggregate compensation. (JEL H23, Q52, Q53, Q54, Q58) </jats:p>
Martin R, Muûls M, Wagner UJ, 2014, Trading Behavior in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
Martin R, Muûls M, Wagner UJ, 2013, The Impact of the EU ETS on Regulated Firms: What is the Evidence After Eight Years?
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