Imperial College London

DrSergioMaffeis

Faculty of EngineeringDepartment of Computing

Senior Lecturer
 
 
 
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Contact

 

+44 (0)20 7594 8390sergio.maffeis Website

 
 
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Location

 

441Huxley BuildingSouth Kensington Campus

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Summary

 

Publications

Citation

BibTex format

@techreport{Maffeis:2010:10.25561/95215,
author = {Maffeis, S and Mitchell, JC and Taly, A},
booktitle = {Departmental Technical Report: 10/6},
doi = {10.25561/95215},
publisher = {Department of Computing, Imperial College London},
title = {Object capabilities and isolation of untrusted web applications},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.25561/95215},
year = {2010}
}

RIS format (EndNote, RefMan)

TY  - RPRT
AB - A growing number of current web sites combine active content(applications) from untrusted sources, as in so-called mashups. The object-capability model provides an appealing approach for isolating untrusted con-tent: if separate applications are provided disjoint capabilities, a sound object-capability framework should prevent untrusted applications from interferingwith each other, without preventing interaction with the user or the hostingpage. In developing language-based foundations for isolation proofs basedon object-capability concepts, we identify a more general notion of author-ity safety that also implies resource isolation. After proving that capabilitysafety implies authority safety, we show the applicability of our frameworkfor a speci c class of mashups. In addition to proving that a JavaScript sub-set based on Google Caja is capability safe, we prove that a more expressivesubset of JavaScript is authority safe, even though it is not based on theobject-capability model.
AU - Maffeis,S
AU - Mitchell,JC
AU - Taly,A
DO - 10.25561/95215
PB - Department of Computing, Imperial College London
PY - 2010///
TI - Object capabilities and isolation of untrusted web applications
T1 - Departmental Technical Report: 10/6
UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.25561/95215
UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/95215
ER -