Publications
120 results found
Calzada J, Valletti T, 2008, Network competition and entry deterrence, Economic Journal, Vol: 118, Pages: 1223-1244, ISSN: 1468-0297
Peitz M, Valletti T, 2008, Content and advertising in the media: pay-tv versus free-to-air, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol: 26, Pages: 949-965, ISSN: 0167-7187
Inderst R, Valletti TM, 2007, MARKET ANALYSIS IN THE PRESENCE OF INDIRECT CONSTRAINTS AND CAPTIVE SALES, JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS, Vol: 3, Pages: 203-231, ISSN: 1744-6414
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- Citations: 5
Szymanki S, Valletti T, 2007, Parallel imports of patented medicines, Healthy IPRs, Editors: Campolini, Pugatch, Jensen, Network, ISBN: 9781906194000
Inderst R, Valletti TM, 2007, A tale of two constraints: assessing market power in wholesale markets, European Competition Law Review, Vol: 28, Pages: 84-91, ISSN: 0144-3054
Hoernig S, Valletti T, 2007, Mixing goods with two-part tariffs, European Economic Review, Vol: 51, Pages: 1733-1750
Valletti T, 2006, Differential pricing, parallel trade, and the incentive to invest, Journal of International Economics, Vol: 70, Pages: 314-324, ISSN: 0022-1996
Buzzacchi L, Valletti TM, 2006, Firm size distribution: testing the "independent submarkets model" in the Italian motor insurance industry, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol: 24, Pages: 809-834, ISSN: 0167-7187
Federico Dini, Riccardo Pacini, Tommaso Valletti, 2006, Scoring Rules, Handbook of Procurement, Editors: Dimitri, Piga, Spagnolo, Cambridge, Publisher: Cambridge University Press, Pages: 293-321, ISBN: 9780521870733
Valletti T, Szymanski S, 2006, Parallel Trade, International Exhaustion and Intellectual Property Rights: A Welfare Analysis, Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol: 54, Pages: 499-526, ISSN: 0022-1821
Valletti TM, Houpis G, 2005, Mobile termination: What is the "right" charge?, JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS, Vol: 28, Pages: 235-258, ISSN: 0922-680X
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- Citations: 19
Szymanski S, Valletti TM, 2005, Parallel trade, price discrimination, investment and price caps, Economic Policy, Vol: 20, Pages: 705-749, ISSN: 0266-4658
Valletti TM, Cambini C, 2005, Investments and network competition, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol: 36, Pages: 446-467, ISSN: 0741-6261
Szymanski S, Valletti TM, 2005, Incentive effects of second prizes, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol: 21, Pages: 467-481, ISSN: 0176-2680
Buzzacchi L, Valletti TM, 2005, Strategic price discrimination in compulsory insurance markets, The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Vol: 30, Pages: 71-97, ISSN: 0926-4957
Szymanski S, Valletti TM, 2005, Promotion and Relegation in Sporting Contests, Rivista di Politica Economica, Vol: 95, Pages: 3-39, ISSN: 0035-6468
The conventional model of a team sports league is based on the North American major leagues which have a fixed number of members, entry is rare and only granted by permission of the incumbents (the closed system). European soccer leagues operate a system of promotion and relegation, effectively permitting entry on merit to all-comers (the open system). This paper examines the impact of openness on the incentive of teams to invest (expend effort) and share resources (redistribution) in the context of a Tullock contest. The main conclusion of the paper is that openness tends to enhance effort incentives, but diminishes the incentive to share income.
Geuna A, Lamberton D, Valletti T, et al., 2005, New directions for IEP, INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Vol: 17, Pages: III-IV, ISSN: 0167-6245
Buzzacchi L, Valletti TM, 2004, Firm size distribution in small samples, Bulletin of Economic Research, Vol: 56, Pages: 301-309, ISSN: 0307-3378
Peitz M, Valletti TM, Wright J, 2004, Competition in telecommunications: an introduction, INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Vol: 16, Pages: 315-321, ISSN: 0167-6245
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- Citations: 18
Valletti TM, 2004, Vertical integration and exclusivity contracts when consumers have switching costs, SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Vol: 71, Pages: 36-59, ISSN: 0038-4038
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- Citations: 2
Valletti T, 2004, Market failures and remedies in mobile telephony, Journal of Network Industries, Vol: 5, Pages: 51-81, ISSN: 1389-9597
Hoernig S, Valletti TM, 2004, The interplay between regulation and competition: the case of universal service obligations, Spectrum auctions and competition in telecommunications, Editors: Illing, Kluh, Cambridge MA, Publisher: MIT Press, Pages: 77-94, ISBN: 9780262090377
Cambini C, 2004, Access charges and quality choice in competing networks, Information Economics and Policy, Vol: 16, Pages: 391-409
Cambini C, Valletti TM, 2003, Network competition with price discrimination: 'bill-and-keep' is not so bad after all, Economics Letters, Vol: 81, Pages: 59-68, ISSN: 0165-1765
Valletti TM, 2003, The theory of access pricing and its linkage with investment incentives, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY, Vol: 27, Pages: 659-675, ISSN: 0308-5961
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- Citations: 40
Valletti TM, 2003, Input price discrimination with downstream Cournot competitors, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, Vol: 21, Pages: 969-988, ISSN: 0167-7187
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- Citations: 38
CAMBINI C, Valletti T, 2003, Competizione tra reti e incentivi all'investimento nelle telecomunicazioni, Rivista Italiana degli Economisti, Vol: 8, Pages: 245-266
This paper first summarises the main results of the recent literature on competition in telecommunication networks, based on the models of Armstrong (1998) and Laffont et al. (1998). We then extend the basic framework by introducing an investment stage, prior to price competition, in order to analyse the incentives that operators have to invest in facilities with different levels of quality. We show that the incentives to invest are influenced by the way termination charges are set. In particular, when the quality of a network has an impact on all calls initiated by own customers (destined both on-net and off-net), we obtain a result of "tacit collusion" even in a symmetric model with two-part pricing. Firms tend to underinvest in quality, and this would be exacerbated if they can negotiate reciprocal termination charges above cost.
Driver C, Valletti TM, 2003, Additive and multiplicative uncertainty revisited: What explains the contrasting biases?, JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR NATIONALOKONOMIE, Vol: 79, Pages: 187-198, ISSN: 0931-8658
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- Citations: 3
Valletti TM, 2003, Is mobile telepony a natural oligopoly?, Review of Industrial Organization, Vol: 22, Pages: 47-65, ISSN: 0889-938X
Buzzacchi L, Szymanski S, Valletti TM, 2003, Equality of opportunity and equality of outcome: open leagues, closed leagues and competitive balance, Journal of Industry Competition and Trade, Vol: 3, Pages: 167-186, ISSN: 1566-1679
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