Imperial College London


Business School

Head of the Department of Economics and Public Policy



+44 (0)20 7594 9215t.valletti Website CV




417City and Guilds BuildingSouth Kensington Campus






BibTex format

author = {Hoernig, S and Inderst, R and Valletti, T},
doi = {10.1111/1756-2171.12046},
journal = {RAND Journal of Economics},
pages = {155--175},
title = {Calling circles: Network competition with non-uniform calling patterns},
url = {},
volume = {45},
year = {2014}

RIS format (EndNote, RefMan)

AB - We introduce a flexible model of telecommunications network competition with nonuniform calling patterns, accounting for the fact that customers tend to make most calls to a small set of similar people. Equilibrium call prices are distorted away from marginal cost, and competitive intensity is affected by the concentration of calling patterns. Contrary to previous predictions, jointly profitmaximizing access charges are set above termination cost in order to dampen competition if calling patterns are sufficiently concentrated. We discuss implications for regulating access charges as well as on and offnet price discrimination.
AU - Hoernig,S
AU - Inderst,R
AU - Valletti,T
DO - 10.1111/1756-2171.12046
EP - 175
PY - 2014///
SN - 0741-6261
SP - 155
TI - Calling circles: Network competition with non-uniform calling patterns
T2 - RAND Journal of Economics
UR -
VL - 45
ER -