Imperial College London

ProfessorWilliamKnottenbelt

Faculty of EngineeringDepartment of Computing

Professor of Applied Quantitative Analysis
 
 
 
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Contact

 

+44 (0)20 7594 8331w.knottenbelt Website

 
 
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Location

 

E363ACE ExtensionSouth Kensington Campus

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Summary

 

Publications

Citation

BibTex format

@inproceedings{Ilie:2020:10.1007/978-3-030-37110-4_9,
author = {Ilie, DI and Knottenbelt, WJ and Stewart, ID},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-37110-4_9},
pages = {117--132},
publisher = {Springer International Publishing AG},
title = {Committing to quantum resistance, better: a speed-and-risk-configurable defence for bitcoin against a fast quantum computing attack},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37110-4_9},
year = {2020}
}

RIS format (EndNote, RefMan)

TY  - CPAPER
AB - In light of the emerging threat of powerful quantum computers appearing in the near future, we investigate the potential attacks on Bitcoin available to a quantum-capable adversary. In particular, we illustrate how Shor’s quantum algorithm can be used to forge ECDSA based signatures, allowing attackers to hijack transactions. We then propose a simple commit–delay–reveal protocol, which allows users to securely move their funds from non-quantum-resistant outputs to those adhering to a quantum-resistant digital signature scheme. In a previous paper (Stewart et al. R. Soc. Open Sci. 5(6), 180410 (2018)) [1] we presented a similar scheme with a long fixed delay. Here we improve on our previous work, by allowing each user to choose their preferred delay–long for a low risk of attack, or short if a higher risk is acceptable to that user. As before, our scheme requires modifications to the Bitcoin protocol, but once again these can be implemented as a soft fork.
AU - Ilie,DI
AU - Knottenbelt,WJ
AU - Stewart,ID
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-37110-4_9
EP - 132
PB - Springer International Publishing AG
PY - 2020///
SN - 2198-7246
SP - 117
TI - Committing to quantum resistance, better: a speed-and-risk-configurable defence for bitcoin against a fast quantum computing attack
UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37110-4_9
UR - https://www.webofscience.com/api/gateway?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000675370400008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=a2bf6146997ec60c407a63945d4e92bb
UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/106238
ER -