Publications
8 results found
Hsieh Y-Y, Vergne J-P, 2023, The future of the web? The coordination and early-stage growth of decentralized platforms, Strategic Management Journal, Vol: 44, Pages: 829-857, ISSN: 0143-2095
This abductive study investigates how management occurs without managerial authority as part of a previously unseen organizational form—the decentralized platform with an independent market value. Our mixed-methods study of the cryptocurrency industry draws on fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analyses (QCA) to analyze archival and interview data and offer new theory on how decentralized platforms coordinate activities to grow in an early stage, before network effects kick in. We find that, in the absence of a central authority, platforms coordinate activities with three mechanisms, namely decentralized (i) algorithmic coordination, (ii) social coordination, and (iii) goal coordination. Our QCA treat these mechanisms as explanatory conditions and, using a representative sample of 20 cryptocurrency platforms, reveal which configurations of decentralized coordination mechanisms nurture, or hinder, early-stage platform growth.
Hsieh Y-Y, Andersen J, 2023, Reorganization and participation in decentralized platform ecosystems: evidence from blockchain forking, Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, Pages: 5363-5371
Like any organizational system, platform ecosystems reorganize to update its alignment with the internal and external environments. However, unlike reorganizations of centrally managed platforms performed by the owners, reorganizations of decentralized platforms ecosystems do not rely on formal authority. Instead, the network self-reorganizes to renew the structure, rules, and information to evolve. Little is known about how self-reorganizations influence the participation of various types of networks. In this study, we investigate nine reorganization events on Ethereum, a blockchain-based decentralized smart contract platform, to unpack how self-reorganization related to hard forking influence participation in the development, validation, transaction, and complementor networks. We find that, while participation increases across all networks show a small increase after hard forking events, more complex dynamics are at play within each network that builds on delicate trade-offs between participation structure, configuration, and incentives. Our findings have implications for blockchain research as well as for start-ups building decentralized applications on top of decentralized smart contract platforms.
Hsieh Y-Y, Wadhwa A, 2022, Designing a glass organization: Boundary decisions for coordination and control based on generalized trust, Academy of Management 2022, Publisher: Academy of Management, ISSN: 2151-6561
Blockchain shows great potential to transform organization designs by enabling generalized trust to facilitate organizational coordination and control. This generalized trust replaces, fully or partially, the need for traditional coordination and control mechanisms, such as formal contracts, authority, and relational trust. Blockchain, a novel form of organizing that entwines its organizational architecture with technology, renders extreme forms of decentralization and autonomy. We conceptualize how blockchain enables generalized trust without hierarchy based on two key boundary design decisions—permeability and transparency. Taking an architectural view with a focus on information processing, we propose a typology of boundary decisions of blockchain systems and formulate propositions linking boundary decisions with the extent of generalized trust in blockchain systems. Further, we propose that complementarity among activities performed in the blockchain system amplifies a trust-enabling organization’s ability to generate generalized trust. Finally, based on the alignment of boundary decisions with goals of adoption, we present two heterogeneous and contrasting modes of adoption—actor-centric vs. technology-centric. Taken together, these two modes form the opposite ends of a continuum, offering potential adopters the flexibility of choosing from a wide range of hybrid modes.
Hsieh Y-Y, Vergne J-P, Anderson P, et al., 2019, Bitcoin and the rise of decentralized autonomous organizations, Journal of Organization Design, Vol: 8, ISSN: 2245-408X
Hsieh Y, Vergne J-P, 2018, Bitcoin and the rise of decentralized autonomous organizations, Journal of Organization Design, Vol: 7, Pages: 1-16, ISSN: 2245-408X
Bitcoin represents the first real-world implementation of a “decentralized autonomous organization” (DAO) and offers a new paradigm for organization design. Imagine working for a global business organization whose routine tasks are powered by a software protocol instead of being governed by managers and employees. Task assignments and rewards are randomized by the algorithm. Information is not channelled through a hierarchy but recorded transparently and securely on an immutable public ledger called “blockchain”. Further, the organization decides on design and strategy changes through a democratic voting process involving a previously unseen class of stakeholders called “miners”. Agreements need to be reached at the organizational level for any proposed protocol changes to be approved and activated.How do DAOs solve the universal problem of organizing with such novel solutions? What are the implications? We use Bitcoin as an example to shed light on how a DAO works in the cryptocurrency industry, where it provides a peer-to-peer, decentralized and disintermediated payment system that can compete against traditional financial institutions. We also invitedcommentaries from renowned organization scholars to share their views on this intriguing phenomenon.
Hsieh Y-Y, vergne J-P, Wang S, 2017, The internal and external governance of blockchain-based organizations: evidence from cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin and beyond. Cryptocurrencies, blockchains, and global governance, Editors: Campbell-Verduyn, Publisher: Taylor & Francis Group, Pages: 48-68, ISBN: 9781315211909
Blockchain technology proposes to create value by decentralizing the creation, verification, validation, and secure storage of economic transactions, both within and between organizations. The chapter provides deeper understanding of how these blockchain solutions would be operated and by whom. It focuses on decentralization as the key dimension by which organizational governance forms vary. The chapter utilizes theory on organizational and corporate governance to unpack how blockchain-based organizations operate. It examines the relationship between internal and external governance design features and cryptocurrency returns. Blockchain-based organizations such as cryptocurrencies compete with traditional economic institutions by proposing alternative forms of organizational governance. Demand for cryptocurrencies mainly stems from two sources: first, consumers and merchants using cryptocurrencies as a means of payment; and second, investors holding a cryptocurrency as an investment, hoping that the price will rise. Many cryptocurrencies were created from the open-source Bitcoin software code, and follow the same open-source development model.
Chakravarty D, Hsieh Y-Y, Schotter APJ, et al., 2017, Multinational enterprise regional management centres: characteristics and performance, Journal of World Business, Vol: 52, Pages: 296-311, ISSN: 1090-9516
In multinational enterprises (MNEs), regional management centres (RMCs) most frequently take the form of either dedicated regional headquarters (RHQs) or regional management mandates (RMMs) assigned to operating subsidiaries. We identify a series of critical differences in characteristics and performance between RHQs and RMMs, using a longitudinal sample of 855 Japanese RMCs across 41 countries. We also investigate parent-level differences between MNEs with distinct RMC configurations. We propose a structural complement to regional strategy extensions of the integration-responsiveness framework, and provide an important large sample baseline, aiding new theoretical and empirical research into MNE regional management strategy and structure.
Arjaliès D-L, Hsieh Y-Y, Vergne J-P, 2017, A reply to Cohen’s “The Rise of Alternative Cryptocurrencies in Post-Capitalism.”, Journal of Management Studies, ISSN: 0022-2380
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