Imperial College London

Professor Yujian Ye

Faculty of EngineeringDepartment of Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Honorary Lecturer
 
 
 
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Contact

 

yujian.ye11

 
 
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Location

 

1105Electrical EngineeringSouth Kensington Campus

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Summary

 

Publications

Citation

BibTex format

@article{Li:2021:10.1109/JIOT.2020.3007196,
author = {Li, J and Ye, Y and Papadaskalopoulos, D and Strbac, G},
doi = {10.1109/JIOT.2020.3007196},
journal = {IEEE Internet of Things Journal},
pages = {734--749},
title = {Computationally Efficient Pricing and Benefit Distribution Mechanisms for Incentivizing Stable Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/JIOT.2020.3007196},
volume = {8},
year = {2021}
}

RIS format (EndNote, RefMan)

TY  - JOUR
AB - Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has emerged as a promising market paradigm towards maximizing the value of distributed energy resources (DER) for electricity prosumers, by enabling direct energy trading among them. However, state-of-the-art P2P mechanisms either fail to adequately incentivize prosumers to participate, prevent prosumers from accessing the highest achievable monetary benefits, or suffer severely from the curse of dimensionality. This paper proposes two computationally efficient mechanisms to construct a stable grand coalition of prosumers participating in P2P trading, founded on cooperative game-theoretic principles. The first one involves a benefit distribution scheme inspired by the core tâtonnement process while the second involves a novel pricing mechanism based on the solution of a single linear program. The performance of the proposed mechanisms is validated against state-of-the-art mechanisms through numerous case studies using real-world data. The results demonstrate that the proposed mechanisms exhibit superior computational performance than the nucleolus and are superior to the rest of the examined mechanisms in incentivizing prosumers to remain in the grand coalition.
AU - Li,J
AU - Ye,Y
AU - Papadaskalopoulos,D
AU - Strbac,G
DO - 10.1109/JIOT.2020.3007196
EP - 749
PY - 2021///
SP - 734
TI - Computationally Efficient Pricing and Benefit Distribution Mechanisms for Incentivizing Stable Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading
T2 - IEEE Internet of Things Journal
UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/JIOT.2020.3007196
VL - 8
ER -