Title:

The strategy of conflict and cooperation

Abstract:

In this paper, I introduce a novel framework, called “cooperative extensive form games” and a novel solution concept, called “cooperative equilibrium system.” I show that non-cooperative extensive form games are a special case of cooperative extensive form games, in which players can strategically cooperate (e.g., by writing a possibly costly contract) or act independently. To the best of my knowledge, I propose the first solution to the long-standing open problem of “strategic cooperation” first identified by von Neumann (1928). I show that cooperative equilibrium system always exists in finite n-person games with possibly imperfect information. Cooperative strategic games unify the study of strategic competition as well as cooperation, which have been studied in specific frameworks.

Biography:

Mehmet S. Ismail is a Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Economics in the Department of Political Economy at King’s College London. Mehmet received his PhD from Maastricht University in 2017, and prior to that he studied at the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and Bielefeld University as part of European Union’s Erasmus Mundus programme. His research interests include game theory and political economy. In his research, he regularly explores topics such as cooperation, fairness, and efficiency. He enjoys playing chess at King’s Chess Society, and he used to be a serious backgammon player.

 


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