Article at a glance

• Intended to democratise organisational governance, new research suggests power in most DAOs is still rather centralised.

• Autonomy is often used to mean both automation and independence, decentralised autonomous organisations (DAOs) promise decisions executed by code and freedom from external control, but most still rely on human judgement and third-party platforms.

• DAOs stand as an important experiment in alternative organisational governance, offering lessons for conventional companies seeking to democratise decision making and decentralise power.

Decentralised autonomous organisations (DAOs) are a blockchain-based alternative to traditional governance structures. Rather than a conventional hierarchy of executives and managers, DAOs aim to give members a more direct role in decision making, with some decisions executed automatically by smart contracts.

The idea is that decisions are voted on, self-executed, and recorded on a blockchain, making them visible to all members to ensure transparency and accountability at scale. This in turn reduces bureaucracy and administrative overheads, making the organisation more democratic, innovative and agile.

Take MakerDAO as an example. In March 2020, a crash triggered by COVID-19 left the organisation with serious liquidity issues. Rather than executives deciding what to do, a novel solution that surfaced informally in a community channel was debated by risk assessors, smart contract code reviewers and ordinary members, and was then approved through a formal vote.

But has the DAO model really resulted in power being shared more democratically across the board? Our research, the largest systematic empirical examination of DAOs to-date, addresses this question.

Who really holds the power?

We found that more than 80 per cent of voting rights in the average DAO are controlled by less than 1 per cent of addresses (and multiple addresses may be controlled by single members). That means power is concentrated within a small group, though unlike in a conventional firm, this emerges through token ownership and low turnout rather than deliberate structure.

“While everybody is entitled to vote, having lots of members does not necessarily mean lots of people have a meaningful say.”

Another factor is the gap between membership and participation. We observed that the average DAO has 5,024 members, but only 709 voters and 10 proposers, with over half of all proposals receiving fewer than 12 votes. While everybody is entitled to vote, having lots of members does not necessarily mean lots of people have a meaningful say.

One key issue is the existence of ‘whales’ and ‘delegates’, i.e. those who control a large number of voting tokens. Whales hold their tokens outright, and are free to vote however they like, including on their own proposals. Delegates, by contrast, are given voting power on behalf of other members, but this power is conditional: they can lose their delegate status if they vote against the wishes of those they represent.

This distinction matters. Whales pose a greater threat to true decentralisation than delegates, because their unconditional voting power answers to nobody but themselves. And because holdings are visible on the blockchain, the position of whales may be known beforehand, which can make the result of a vote feel like a foregone conclusion. Delegates, despite holding real voting weight, rarely use it unilaterally, as going against their delegators’ wishes risks their position.

Whales can also buy more tokens to sway contested decisions. In many cases, a large share of voting tokens are locked in vesting arrangements held by founders and early investors – in the average DAO, vesting tokens equal 38% of liquid holdings. When these are unlocked, voting power can be further concentrated, exacerbating the issue.

Automation isn’t independence

There is a question as to how autonomous DAOs really are. ‘Autonomy’ can mean two different things: automation, i.e. decisions executed without human involvement, and independence, i.e. freedom from outside control.

Most DAOs attempt both, but often achieve neither. We found that only around 8% use on-chain governance, where votes are recorded and executed automatically via blockchain. The rest rely on off-chain voting through third-party platforms, with humans viewing results and carrying out decisions – the opposite of blockchain automation, though not completely independent of all oversight.

This offers a wider lesson beyond DAOs. It is tempting to view the trend of businesses increasingly handing decisions to AI tools as a form of self-sufficiency, in which processes run themselves free of human oversight. But if DAOs are any guide, automating decisions does not bring independence – it substitutes reliance on people for reliance on digital infrastructure and the third parties who run it.

What businesses can learn

Ultimately, our evidence suggests that DAOs fall short of the decentralised, autonomous ideal on which they were designed. However, this is not to say that they fail as an innovation. Rather, they stand as an important experiment in alternative organisational governance. They are best understood as a distinct organisational form in their own right – something closer to a financialised community or an algorithmic commons than either a corporation or a traditional community. 

Conventional companies can also borrow elements of the DAO model, experimenting with giving employees, customers and other stakeholders a more direct voice in decision making. The MakerDAO example shows how this can work in practice – collective decisions settled through proposing and voting – even under urgent conditions that would normally require centralised, top-down control.