How platforms can win by selling smarter, not harder

New research shows how platforms can manage competition more effectively by rethinking how they share information with providers

3 minute read
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Many online service platforms - think HomeAdvisor, RatedPeople, or Porch - face a common challenge: they sell job leads to providers who must then compete fiercely for customer attention. Allowing customers to post short-term jobs, these service providers can pay for access. However, if the competition is perceived to be too high, they’ll hold back, hurting both the platforms’ revenues and their growth potential.

We explore an innovative way these online platforms can strategically use information to manage provider expectations, boosting participation and revenues simultaneously.

Understanding provider behaviour

Service providers buy leads hoping to win jobs from customers. However, too many providers chasing a single lead decreases the value of participation. This fear of excessive competition can discourage them from buying leads in the first place.

Platforms possess critical information - the number of providers interested in a particular job -that they typically don’t share openly. This lack of transparency creates uncertainty, often making providers overly cautious.

One of the key benefits highlighted in the study is that partial information disclosure can help manage provider expectations based on the level of competition. 

Nudging providers towards participation

Our study uses a framework known as Bayesian persuasion - the strategic sharing of information to influence someone’s decision by shaping what they believe. The framework allowed us to analyse how platforms can optimise the information they reveal about provider competition. The key insight: carefully tailored partial information can significantly increase lead purchases.

One of the key benefits highlighted in the study is that partial information disclosure can help manage provider expectations based on the level of competition. When competition is below a certain threshold, the mechanism allows interested providers to see clear value, as their chances of securing the job remain favourable. Conversely, for leads facing intense competition, i.e., above the threshold, a fixed, limited number of providers are encouraged to purchase the lead, regardless of how many are actually interested. Interestingly, providers respond positively to this consistent approach, perceiving their chances as favourable even in more competitive situations.

Why fixed prices beat flexible ones

Platforms often try dynamic pricing, changing lead prices based on real-time competition. Interestingly, the research finds this common practice is suboptimal. A well-designed fixed-price approach, paired with strategic information disclosure, generates more revenue.

Why? Providers perceive dynamic pricing as a direct signal of competition intensity - higher prices might mean higher demand, but also tougher competition. This direct correlation reduces their willingness to participate. In contrast, a fixed price coupled with carefully managed information reduces uncertainty, minimises coordination failures among providers, and consistently boosts revenue.

Effective real-world implementation

Implementing these insights is straightforward. Platforms need only set clear limits on how many providers can purchase each lead. This is already practiced informally by some platforms, but the study provides a precise method to identify optimal numbers, maximising provider participation and platform profits simultaneously.

By harnessing these insights, platforms can unlock new growth opportunities, sing revenues through smarter management of provider competition, rather than just harder selling.

 

This article reflects on findings from the paper "Information Design and Pricing in Lead-Selling Platforms with Supply Competition" by Jiahua Wu with co-authors Yanwei Sun, Niloofar Zamani-Foroushani and Zhe Liu from the Imperial Business School.

 

This article was updated on 1 August 2025 to credit all the co-authors of the original research paper and their findings cited in the article.

Meet the author

  • Jiahua Wu

    About Jiahua Wu

    Associate Professor of Operations
    Jiahua Wu is an Associate Professor of Operations at Imperial Business School. He received his Ph.D. in Operations Management from Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto. He also holds a master's in electrical and computer engineering from University of Toronto, and a bachelor's in electronic engineering from Tsinghua University. Jiahua's research interests include platform operations, revenue management, and mechanism design.

    Read Jiahua's Imperial Profile for more information and publications.